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In an era of declining defense budgets, the DOD must revise its
modernization strategy if it is to continue to field world class equipment. One
viable alternative strategy is to combine funds and effort whenever possible
through the use of joint service acquisition programs. However, the Services have
been reluctant in the past to initiate joint service programs and will probably
continue to be reluctant in the future unless certain changes are made to the
acquisition process. This thesis examines the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
program and identifies issues through a series of interviews with key Government
individuals within the UAV Short Range (SR) program office and the UAV Joint
Program Office (JPO). as well as with representatives of the users within the Army
and Marine Corps. Comments received during the interviews were used in
conjunction with program documentation to formulate issues which impact the
UAV-SR program and are a direct result of the joint status of the program. The
issues identified are not all currently problem areas for the UAV-SR. but they have
the potential to become problem areas. The recommendations made in this thesis
are specific to the UAV-SR and may also be applicable to other joint service
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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze joint service acquisition programs
and to determine how these types of programs may be of greater use to the
Department of Defense (DOD) in the future. This thesis is a case study of the
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) program and. while the conclusions will be
specific as they apply to the UAV. some of the lessons learned and insights may
also be applicable to joint service programs in general.
B. BACKGROUND
The United States has been the world leader in weapons technology since
the end of World War II. Victory in the Cold War and in the Persian Gulf are the
most recent examples of the successful union of the military and the industrial
capabilities of the U.S. Much of the success the United States enjoyed in
Operation Desert Storm can be attributed to the superior weaponry that it had
built and fielded in the years prior to the conflict. The pace at which the U.S.
modernized its military, especially during the 1980s, also contributed to the
dissolution of the Eastern Bloc. However, the fact that the U.S. already possesses
the world's best weapons, along with the fall of the Soviet Union, has created a
perception amongst some that modernization may no longer be critical for the
military. Certainly, the threat to peace has diminished, but. for the military to
maintain its leadership role in the world it must continue its modernization
strategy.
The apparent collapse of communism brought not only a renewed sense of
security to the world but also a change in priorities for the American public. The
focus shifted from foreign policy to the domestic situation and first on the agenda
was a major decrease in the defense budget. As of the current date, the exact size
of the decrease is not known, however, it is expected that a one-third reduction is
possible.
The challenge for DOD now is to equip the soldiers, sailors and marines with
world class equipment in a period of drastically reduced defense budgets. DOD
must find ways to spend its acquisition funds more wisely. One method of
maximizing research and development and procurement funds is to utilize a
strategy of sharing resources between the Services. Thus, the role of joint service
acquisition programs within DOD may be expected to increase in the future.
Acquisition programs are usually not joint from their inception and few
programs become joint without some initiative by OSD or the Congress. Joint
service acquisition programs are normally instituted for operational and/or
economic reasons. Coordination and interoperability between the Services is
usually enhanced if common systems are used. Additionally, Research.
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) costs are reduced when these efforts
are consolidated and total system costs can also be lower if larger quantities of
systems are procured. Today, joint programs are strongly supported and
encouraged by OSD and Congress. [Ref. 1
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In the present acquisition climate, however, the Services must lead the way
in becoming more efficient in the research, development and procurement arenas
if they wish to continue to field new systems with fewer funds. One viable
alternative is for the Services to look for more opportunities to combine effort and
funds for systems which can be jointly procured and used by more than one
Service. In fact. DOD Directive 5000.1. "Defense Acquisition." states that prior to
the initiation of a new acquisition program a full range of alternatives must be
considered. In considering the alternatives, a new joint-Service program is
preferred over a new single-Service program. |Ref 2|
For the DOD to fully utilize the benefits of joint service acquisition programs,
though, the barriers and issues which have hindered these types of programs in
the past must be identified and resolved.
C THESIS OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to identify the problems and issues involved in
the management of joint service acquisition programs. Although joint programs
have been utilized throughout our nation's history, they have not been used to
the extent that they could. There have been many more opportunities to have
joint service acquisitions but they have been limited because of a myriad of
reasons, not the least of which has been interservice rivalries. The focus of this
thesis will be the UAV, a program that appears to have been ideally suited for a
joint status from the beginning, but was not. The Services had individual UAV
programs which were subsequently plagued by problems until DOD was directed
by Congress to initiate a joint program or all funding for UAVs would stop. The
joint program now appears to be a success.
This thesis will identify some of the issues involved with the management of
the Joint UAV program. It will attempt to offer plausible recommendations to
alleviate the impact of these issues on future joint programs. It will analyze the
UAV program from its conceptual development and progress as individual Service
programs, through the creation of the joint program, and developments in the
program up to the present. The thesis will examine the effectiveness of current
policies for the management of joint service programs and how these policies are
implemented in the UAV program. Additionally, the benefits of sharing costs and
resources in the development o( a joint system will be analyzed. The problem
areas and recommendations for improvement identified through this thesis will
hopefully be of use to the UAV Joint Program Office (JPO) as well as to the DOD
acquisition structure.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
What are the major issues involved in the management of joint Service
programs?
2. Subsidiary Research Questions
a) What is DOD's current policy for the Management of Joint Service
Programs?
b) Is there enough similarity among the single Service UAV programs
to warrant a joint Service program?
c) What lessons can been learned from the UAV Joint Program?
d) What are the actual benefits of the joint status as experienced
within the UAV JPC7
e) What recommended changes to the current acquisition policy
would encourage the establishment of more joint service programs and
contribute to a greater likelihood of their success?
E. RESEARCH SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
A detailed analysis of all DOD Joint Service Programs is beyond the scope of
this thesis. Rather, this thesis will examine the acquisition climate during a specific
time frame and with a specific program. This thesis will identify the DOD policies
affecting joint programs from the initiation of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
program up to the present.
This thesis is limited to the policies and procedures as they are currently
implemented. The acquisition field within DOD is currently undergoing major
changes and revisions and it is virtually impossible to include the absolute latest
material in all areas. Therefore, proposed changes and drafts to regulations and
directives will not routinely be referenced.
Recommendations and comments will be made as they pertain to the UAV
JPO and joint programs in general. This thesis is a case study of a specific program
and. as such, the conclusions will be specific as they apply to the UAV program
and general as they apply to other joint programs.
F. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The background and policy information was obtained from written sources.
The history of the UAV programs from the Army and Navy are well-documented
in program documents, congressional records and news publications which were
all used. The Joint Logistics Commanders Guide for the Management of Joint
Service Programs published by the Defense Systems Management College served
as the principal source of officially prescribed policies and procedures. The
analysis and evaluation of the UAV JPO was partially the result of extensive
interviews with key Government individuals assigned to the Short Range
program offices as well other key agencies. The questions during the interviews
varied dependent on each individual's position within the program and their
particular areas of expertise. However, each person was asked to state his
perception o( the advantages and disadvantages of joint programs versus single
Service programs. Additionally, the program office provided the LIAV Master Plan
and many other program documents as reference material.
II. JOINT SERVICE AQUISITION
A. BACKGROUND OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION
The United States Department of Defense is the largest and most complex
business organization in the world. It is responsible for developing and producing
the most advanced weaponry in history. From its inception though, the military
has never been fully independent of the private sector in meeting its war material
needs. The armed forces have always relied on private enterprise to supply the
material, equipment, and services needed in peace and war. Before and during
World War II, the defense industry was concerned primarily with simplicity,
reliability, and producibility. Industry quickly responded to the needs of the
military and the process was noted for its relative efficiency. After the 1950s,
however, the industry became one of custom design and development and DOD
oversight began to play a major role. When the Department of Defense was
established in 1947. the Secretary of Defense was limited to providing general
direction to the three military departments and. therefore, had no authority to
implement a formal DOD acquisition policy. Each Service was responsible for the
development and procurement of its own systems, independent of the other
Services.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) did. however, publish a very
general document in 1947 which covered business operations between industry
and DOD. The document was called the Armed Services Procurement Regulation
and numbered 125 pages. In 1958. the Department of Defense Reorganization
Act greatly expanded the role of the Defense Secretary and gave him the
authority to assign the development, production, and operational use of weapon
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systems to any military department or Service. |Ref 3| Thus began an era of ever
increasing oversight by OSD in the defense acquisition process. In 1984. the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the primary set o( regulations for all
Federal executive agencies relating to Federal procurement, was published. These
regulations numbered 1.200 pages. Military procurement was fast becoming a
major economic entity within the country and congressional oversight and
regulation was growing rapidly. There presently exists volumes upon volumes of
regulations and policy statements which relate to defense acquisition, all of which
make the process more complex and expensive.
During the decade of the 1980s, nearly S130 billion was spent each year on
defense research and development and on production of weapon systems and
equipment. In one year alone, more than one hundred major defense systems
were in various stages of development and production. A major weapon system
being defined as not only the major end item itself, such as a tank or aircraft, but
also all of the subsystems, logistical support, training and software that are needed
to operate and support it. As the programs became more technologically
advanced and complex the costs began to skyrocket. Weapons procurement
became synonymous with cost overruns and schedule delays in the eyes of
Congress and the American public.
B. JOINT PROGRAMS AS A VIABLE STRATEGY
In 1961, newly appointed Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was
instructed by President Kennedy to develop the force structure necessary to meet
the military requirements at the lowest possible cost. McNamara had been a very
successful businessman and had risen to the top of Ford Motor Company prior to
8
his appointment as Secretary of Defense. From the outset, he was concerned with
cost overruns in the development of weapon systems and set out to upgrade the
effectiveness and efficiency in the Defense Establishment. [Ref. 4|
The Defense Reorganization Act granted OSD a greater role in DOD
procurement and McNamara fully intended to better control military spending.
When he learned that the Air Force and the Navy both had plans for new tactical
fighters he intervened. Since the two planes would have many common missions
and require similar capabilities he directed the two Services to jointly develop a
new common tactical fighter. The TFX (tactical fighter, experimental) was later
designated the F-l 1 1 and was to replace the Air Force F-105 and the Navy F4H
aircraft. At the time, each Service was in the process of developing its own aircraft
independently and Mr. McNamara was convinced that a single fighter would
save at least $1 billion. The Navy and Air Force were opposed to a common
tactical fighter and did as little as possible to cooperate in the joint venture.
Interservice bickering over the operational requirements, technical specifications
and even the management structure led to congressional interference and
eventually to the program's demise. [Ref 5)
Few of the critics argued about the benefits that the concept of a joint
aircraft would have provided. The advantages would have included savings in
development, production, maintenance, and operating costs as well as in logistical
support. The two Services' RDT&E funds could have been consolidated to save
the costs of efforts which were being duplicated in the two separate programs.
Also, a larger procurement of a single aircraft would have resulted in lower unit
costs and a more efficient logistics system. Had the budget constraints of today
been present during Mr. McNamara's term, the outcome of the program may have
been different. Although the TFX failed as a joint service program. Mr.
McNamara's efforts contributed greatly to laving the foundation which would
make joint service acquisition a viable alternative strategy in future military
procurements.
C. MANAGEMENT OF JOINT SERVICE PROGRAMS
The following discussion of the management of joint service acquisition
programs concentrates on the differences between single service programs and
joint service programs. The primary source for the "official" policies and
procedures for the management of joint service programs is the Joint Logistics
Commanders Guide for the Management of Joint Service Programs. 3rd Edition,
published by the Defense Systems Management College in 1987. |Ref 6j DOD
guidance for joint programs is limited to very general policies and procedures as
outlined in the recently updated 5000 series publications. DOD Instruction
5000.2. Part 12, Section B, contains three pages of instructions for the
management of joint acquisition programs.
1. Establishing Joint Programs
Joint programs can and should be established between two or more
Services whenever a similar need or requirement exists. However, the Services in
the past have been reluctant to establish joint programs because of questions
concerning Service unique operational concepts, performance specifications,
configuration constraints and management structure. In an effort to promote and
facilitate the establishment of joint programs, the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC) was created in 1984 under the auspices of the Joint Chiefs of
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Staff (JCS). The members of the JROC include the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the Air
Force and Army, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Commandant
of the Marine Corps, and the Director of the Joint Staff. The chairmanship is
rotated among the Services. The primary responsibilities of the JROC are to:
examine potential joint military requirements: identify, evaluate and select
candidates for joint programs: provide oversight of cross-service requirements
and management issues: and resolve Service issues that arise after a joint program
is initiated. The JROC issued a Memorandum for the Record in 1986 which
stated the generally accepted benefits of joint programs and instructed each
Service to implement procedures whereby programs/requirements are reviewed
by the Services themselves to specifically determine the potential for inter-Service
programs. Each Service is responsible for assigning a joint potential designator to
each new research and development (R&D) program which has been approved
for initiation. The designation will be one of the following:
a. Independent . There is no potential for other Service use or joint
systems development.
b. Interoperating . Joint program management is inappropriate but a
potential for joint operation or joint systems interface exists.
c. Joint . A potential for joint R&D program management and/or joint
procurement exists.
If a common or related set of requirements exists among two or more
Services and these requirements could be most cost effectively achieved through
a joint program, then the participants are required to negotiate specific roles,
activities and responsibilities. Once a program has been identified as having joint
potential, a "lead or executive Service" is designated to assume the authority and
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responsibility for managing the joint program. The lead Service will assign a
program manager (PM). initiate the program charter, and act as the coordinator of
interservice relationships. A joint program may fall into one of a variety of
categories that have evolved over the years as represented in Table I. The lead
Service should have total program funding authority and responsibility with the
other participating Services responsible for any Service unique efforts, changes
and procurements. The Joint Program Charter is one of the most important
documents in the early stages of program initiation. The Charter should state the
program objective, define the PM's authority, specify funding and resource
responsibilities, identify the chain of command and designate the program office
organization.
Finally, the establishment of a joint program must include the
delineation of the needs of all participating Services into a specific requirements
statement. The General Accounting Office (GAO) has stated that getting
agreement on joint requirements has been the greatest problem in joint acquisition
programs [Ref. 7|. Ideally, the Mission Need Statement (MNS) will serve as the
requirements document and will be approved by all Services prior to a program
initiation. However, in most cases a joint program is created by merging two or
more existing single-Service programs. In either case, the statement of operational
requirements (the MNS or Operational Requirements Document [ORD|) must
satisfy the operational needs of all participating Services without unduly
compromising individual Service needs. The tendency has been for each Service
to overstate or over-specify requirements to ensure that its needs are met.
Compromise and trade-offs should be recognized as an essential element of the
12
TABLE I. JOINT PROGRAM CATEGORIES
Program Category Characteristics
S-l See note below
s-: Single-sen ice
Manager ( Executive)
Single-sen ice program; interest Irom other sen iceisi manilestcd by their
consumption or use oi end product: ail program direction and funding has
Agent) single source
S-3 Single-sen ice PMO
with Point of Contact
Single-sen ice program: interest from other senice(s) manifested b\ then
designation of a sen ice point of contact (POC) for maintaining liaison
S-4 Single-sen ice PMO
with On-Site Liaison
Single-sen ice program: interest from other sen ice(s) manifested by their
assignment at a full-time (PCS) liaison officer
S-5 Single-sen ice PMO
with Senior
Representative
Single-sen ice program: representative! s) from other senice(s) assigned
to PMO: all authority and responsibility to program manager stems from
parent sen ice, no formal coordination of requirements, charter, etc.
S-6 Fully Integrated Joint
Program Office (JPO)
Multisen ice participation,integrated JPO, staffed by all participating ser-
\ ices.directed by program manager assigned by lead sen ice. Participating
sen ices may perform some program functions but on behalf of JPO, not
for separate sen ice program. MODEL JPO
M-l Lead-Senice
Coordinated Programs
Programs exist in more than one sen ice;one sen ice PMO provides coor-




More than one sen ice has program in the technical discipline. A lead ser-
vice is not assigned.The objectives of the programs may not be the same.
Direction, coordi nation and/or standardization is executed not through a
designated lead sen ice, but by OSD. either directly or through a PMO
established for the purpose and reporting, not to a military sen ice acqui-
sition commander, but the OSD
M-3 Coniederated
Programs
More than one sen ice has at least one program in the generic technical
area and the end products oi' which are used in allied but separate warfare





Single-sen ice has specific requirement, but acknow ledging that another
sen ice has preeminent capability or interest in execution of a part ol the
program objective, arranges for that segment to be executed by the other
scnicc
Note: A Program Designator Code of S-l denotes a single-scnicc program and accordingly is not
included in the table.
(Source: Guide for the Management of Joint Service Programs:p. 1-2)
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process by all participants and cooperation on the part of the Services in this
regard will contribute greatly to the program's overall success. |Ref. 6:pp. 2-1 - 2-
71
2. Acquisition Strategy
Once a joint acquisition program has been established, the PM must
determine the acquisition strategy. An acquisition strategy is considered the
overall plan for executing the program whereas the acquisition plan is the activity
oriented means of achieving the strategy. The acquisition strategy defines the
interrelationship between management, technical, business, resource, force
structure, support, testing, and other aspects of the program. It must be kept
current throughout the life of the program and address management issues from
development to production that assess the impact of: 1) different levels of
funding; 2) problems in testing; 3) changes in requirements; 4) control of
engineering changes; 5) length of product maturation; and 6) effects of lead
time. The Army, Navy, and Air Force each address acquisition planning and
strategy development in slightly different ways. In the Army. Acquisition Strategy
and Acquisition Plan are two separate documents. In the Navy, the Acquisition
Plan satisfies the Acquisition Strategy requirements and in the Air Force the two
are synonymous. Likewise, the Services address slightly different acquisition
strategy elements when formulating single-Service acquisition issues. The
following ten issues should be considered in the joint environment:
Issue 1 - Competition
Issue 2 - Concurrency/Time Phasing
Issue 3 - Data Rights
14
Issue 4 - Design-to-Cost
Issue 5 - Incentives
Issue 6 - Make-or-Buy
Issue 7 - Multivear Contracting
Issue 8 - Phased Acquisition
Issue 9 - Pre-planned Product Improvement
Issue 10 - Source Selection
While most of the ten acquisition issues addressed are common to all
Services, some may be prioritized differently or may be more difficult to implement
because of a joint status. Concurrency, or the overlapping of tasks or phases in
the acquisition cycle, may be more difficult in a joint program because problems in
testing of all participants compatibility requirements may arise or one Service may
be slow in granting approval to move to the next stage. Conversely, concurrency
may be more prevalent in a joint program to the point of being detrimental if it
exists out of necessity to meet schedule requirements and is not adequately
managed. An example may be a requirement by one Service to test all
interoperability requirements, even in the early developmental stages, which
might lead to attempts to solve difficult problems before all of the minor ones are
satisfied. In the Design-to-Cost (DTC) issue, the Army requires that DTC be
implemented on software programs of $40 million or more and the other Services
have no such requirement. The need to satisfy all Service-unique regulations may
further complicate the management of joint service programs and increase overall
program costs. The acquisition strategy for a joint program can certainly be more
complex than a single-service program but it can be successful if it is tailored and
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modifiable and addresses the ten acquisition issues. Joint service programs should
also be recognized as different and problems with conflicting regulations and
requirements should be resolved by the participants. |Ref. 6:pp. 4-1 - 4-19|
3. Organization and Staffing
There is no standard organization for a joint program. The organization
may be one of a wide variety depending on the size and goals of the program, the
acquisition strategy, the role of OSD and JCS. and the relationship among the
participating Services. Joint programs normally require more personnel than
single-service programs due to the greater need for coordination. They generally
require more diverse skills and specialties in the joint program office to handle the
increased complexities of a joint acquisition. The rank structure tends to be higher
as well because of the increased responsibilities and the need to be
knowledgeable of the other Services' operations. A higher ranking person may
also better represent the needs of his Service. The staff is also larger because it
must maintain larger volumes of records, conduct additional budget activities, and
prepare separate briefings to the participating Services. A joint service program is
usually structured under one of the following three methods:
a. Normal Joint Service Program Offices . For the most part, these
programs are structured and managed as a single-service program. The
participating Service may assign a liaison or it may simply monitor the program.
Normally, the interests of the lead Service dominates.
b. Jointly Staffed Program Offices . The lead Service provides the
PM. most of the program management staff, and administrative support.
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Participating Services provide a deputy PM and other military officers to the
program management staff.
c. Multiple Program Offices. These are multiple programs whose
activities are coordinated. The degree and method of coordination vary from
program to program. Frequently. OSD plays a direct role in the program's
execution. Four examples of these structures are depicted in Figure 1. In Structure
A. each Service manages its own program but exchanges information regularly
with the other Services. OSD may divide responsibilities among the Services to
eliminate duplication of effort. In Structure B. a jointly staffed OSD program office
is created and OSD directs the program. In Structure C, one of the Services
provides overall program management. In Structure D, program direction is
provided by an executive committee.
Program office staffing of joint programs usually follows the
organization practice of the lead Service. The Army tends to use matrix
organizations where functional support is brought into the program to
supplement a cadre of managers. The Navy and Air Force tend to use self-
contained program offices especially in high-priority programs. In both cases, the
joint program office should ensure that staff members from participating Services
have a proper allocation of key positions to maintain a balance within the
program office. Some challenges for the PM in a joint program office include
properly and fairly evaluating officers from the participating Services and
developing esprit de corps within the program office. [Ref. 6:pp. 6-1 - 6-6|
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4. Engineering, Production, and Software Management
The three areas of management: engineering, production, and software,
are vital to the success of any major acquisition program. Engineering
management involves the process of transforming an operational need into a
description of system performance parameters and a system configuration
including all hardware and embedded software requirements. The joint program
manager must be concerned with the multitude of Service directives, instructions,
regulations, orders, and military standards (MIL-STD) which will impact his
program. There currently is an effort to streamline standards and specifications by
the Services, but the PM must be aware of all of the applicable MIL-STDs the
participating Services are using. The other key area of concern for the PM is in
design changes. Changes to system requirements will inevitably lead to changes
in the system design which may bring about a virtually new program. The
painstaking effort required to obtain a consensus on the original system
requirements by all of the participants will have to be repeated every time a
design change is implemented.
Production management includes the evaluation of production criteria
prior to the decision to produce, and subsequently monitoring the production
effort to ensure that it is efficient and effective. DOD directives and instructions
should be followed in this area and are fairly uniform between the Services.
Software management involves the design, development and testing of
all of the embedded software within the system. The joint program manager must
ensure that the potential for interservicing of software is reviewed and that all
software support options are fully analyzed. The PM must work closely with all
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using and developing activities to ensure that the resulting software fulfills its
designated requirements. |Ref. 6:pp. 8-1 - 8-7|
5. Logistics
Logistics management objectives of joint programs are to: 1) foster
economic joint performance of Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) planning,
analysis and documentation: 2) satisfy essential needs of each of the
participating Services: and 3) attain established readiness and supportability
objectives. The lead Service should make every effort to meet the unique
requirements of the participating Services. When the lead Service has designated
its ILS Manager, a Joint ILS Plan (JILSP) should be prepared. The plan should be
prepared in conjunction with the participating Services and should include all
unique Service ILS program planning information and requirements. Each Service
is usually unique in its support system, including: organizational structures,
training, facilities, test equipment, and support environment. These Service
differences may seriously impact the equipment design (especially maintenance
characteristics), or the range of feasible support concepts, and the support
resource requirements. Successful logistics management should include continual
coordination between the participating Services, joint use of intermediate
maintenance facilities, and proper use of tools such as the JILSP and Logistics
Support Analysis (LSA). [Ref. 6:pp. 9-1 - 9-1 1
1
6. Test and Evaluation
DOD Instruction 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition Management Policies
and Procedures," Part 8, provides the general DOD policy concerning Test and
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Evaluation (T&E) (Ref. 8|. In addition, each Service has its own T&E regulation
which implements the DOD directive. The major tasks of T&E in a joint program
are to assist in the design process and to address the areas of risk as detailed in
the program charter. T&E is conducted to demonstrate the feasibility of the
system, to minimize design risks, and to determine the design alternatives and
trade-offs necessary to best achieve the program objectives. Developmental
testing (DT&E) will be used to validate the system design and operational testing
(OT&E) will be used to satisfy the operational effectiveness and suitability of the
system prior to entering the next acquisition phase of the program. Although all
programs have developmental and operational tests, the Services may use some
different terms to specify the various points in the program cycle that the tests
occur. The key feature of the review process which compares program progress
with the program goals and objectives is the demonstrated performance of the
system at various stages. T&E is the primary means of demonstrating
performance and, based on the results, the program may be continued, redirected
or canceled.
In 1978, the Joint Logistics Commanders (JLC) established a Test and
Evaluation Planning Guidance Ad Hoc Group which was tasked to assess the
joint testing environment as it existed in the late 1970s and to develop policy and
guidance for greater commonality of test and evaluation effort. Some of the
Group's work resulted in changes to regulations which require joint program
testing to be performed in accordance with the directives of the lead Service, a
Compendium of Test Terminology which was published and made available to
the test community, and the establishment of a permanent joint acquisition DT&E
interface group. In addition, the OT&E Commanders appointed an Ad Hoc Group
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to resolve Multi-Service T&E and Joint T&E issues. A Multi-Service T&E is
usually conducted by more than one Service tor a joint Service acquisition
program. The Multi-Service T&E is normally conducted in accordance with the
T&E regulations and procedures o( the lead Service. Joint T&E is OSD directed
and funded and is structured to evaluate a system with more than one Service
participating or with interacting systems from other Services. It is not normally
applied to an acquisition program.
D. LESSONS LEARNED FROM PREVIOUS JOINT PROGRAMS
The Guide for the Management of Joint Service Programs presents a
number of lessons learned from past joint service acquisition programs, some of
which were successful and some that were not. The lessons learned were
compiled from a variety of sources which include articles for the defense
acquisition community and GAO reports for Congress. Since all joint programs are
different, these lessons may or may not be applicable to a specific program. As
previously discussed, joint Service programs in general require more planning,
coordinating and effort, than do most single-Service programs. The objectives of a
joint program are to increase effectiveness, decrease costs, and to exploit
technology while maintaining a balance with the requirements. These lessons
learned were taken from studies of joint programs from the late 1970s to the mid-
1980s. Many joint programs were looked at but only those that were considered
to be successful were specifically identified. The programs recognized as
successful joint ventures include: the Hellfire Missile; the F-4 Aircraft; the Joint
Cruise Missile; the NAVSTAR GPS; the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air
Missile (AMRAAM); and, the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS).
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Some of the lessons learned from these joint programs are:
1. Joint Charter . The earlier a joint charter can be established, the
greater probability of program success. Early agreement on the ground rules of
the program will allow the PM to proceed with minimal interference. Each
participating Service should be involved in the development of the charter and
the responsibilities of the various aspects of the program should be clearly
defined and agreed to by all participants.
2. Leadership . The program must have strong, flexible leadership.
Problems will inevitably arise between the Services and the leadership must be
capable of putting aside parochial interests and making the right decision, even if
it is contrary to the desires of the Service the individual is assigned to. Strong
leadership is essential to remain impartial and objective and to minimize the
adverse affects of external forces on the program.
3. Fairness . Equitable management and engineering procedures are
critical in building and maintaining the required support of not only the Services,
but also the individuals assigned to the program. There should be appropriate
representation of the Services in the program management and in the engineering
process. Individuals of each Service should be treated fairly and all Service
unique requirements should be approached equitably.
4. Compromise . Allowances must be made for differences in
procedures and approaches among the Services. An attempt must be made by
each Service to minimize duplication and non-critical requirements. Cooperation
among the participants can help to identify unnecessary and time consuming
work for the program office and lead to shortened delivery schedules.
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5. High Visibility . Joint programs are of great interest to higher
authorities and require additional briefings and communication. The tendency in
joint programs is for each Service to request numerous briefings to ensure that no
other Service or agency is more informed. The additional briefings and
communication requires much more time from the program office and is rarely
conducted simultaneously for more than one Service.
6. Program Structure . The structure of the joint program office
should be consistent with the strengths and needs of the Services. The primary
using Service should serve as the Lead Service. Consideration should also be
given to the Service with the greatest expertise in the particular systems field. The
Lead Service should seek assistance from the best labs and support agencies
available irrespective of Service affiliation.
7. Logistics . Logistics is typically one of the hardest areas to work
out and is usually resolved by the working level specialists from the various
Services rather than higher levels. Logistics problems must be resolved early in
the development stage and changes should be kept to a minimum. Ideally, a single
logistics system can be used for all Services.
8. Integrity . Always provide accurate data and information to the
participating Services, DOD and Congress. Unquestionable integrity is always
demanded in the military but it is even more important in joint programs. The
oversight by Congress. DOD and the other Services requires not only truthful but
also complete data and information. Individuals in a single Service program may
not offer complete data or information unless it is asked for, but in a joint program,
such an action may be perceived as an attempt to hide bad news. The result will
undoubtedly be increased oversight and could lead to feelings of mistrust.
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9. Learn from Past Programs . A final lesson learned is that with the
increased emphasis placed on the joint acquisition of weapon systems by the
Congress. OSD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the number of joint Service programs
in the future will increase. A study of past joint programs can be very useful in
identifying problem areas and potential solutions for future programs. However,
current programs must also be studied to identify recurring problems, to determine
which solutions have and have not been effective, and to provide an assessment
for future potential.
An illustration from the lessons learned of one program will
demonstrate how some of the issues involved with joint programs were
successfully resolved. The Hellfire missile was designed from the onset to meet
common performance requirements from the Army, Navy and Marine Corps. The
performance requirements were agreed upon and satisfied each Service. The
missiles for the various Services were virtually identical. There was only one
difference between the Army version of the missile (AGM-114A) and the Navy
version (AGM-1 14B). The Navy missile included an additional safety device to
prevent accidental firing by the electromagnetic fields in the shipboard
environment. Since this was the only Service unique requirement, a slight
modification to the Navy missile was possible and cost effective. Additionally, the
Navy OT&E was completed in a cost effective manner because it followed the
Army's test and used as much of the same data as was possible. The Army had
also resolved most of the problems it had encountered during its test prior to the
Navy's test. The acquisition strategy the program used was also very effective.
The program used competitive bids from two sources because of the larger
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quantities demanded by the three Services and as a result the unit cost decreased
from $43,500 in 1984 to S27.800 in 1986. (Ref. 6:p. 13-4]
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III. HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY OF THE UAV
A. REQUIREMENTS GENERATION
1. The U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps
The concept of using unmanned aerial vehicles in combat is not new.
During World War II. the U.S. Air Force experimented with UAVs in an attempt to
allow its limited number of trained pilots to concentrate on the most critical of
missions. The UAVs were aircraft which flew a pre-programmed route and were
equipped with cameras which would photograph the desired area of operations.
The concept envisioned a retrieval of these aircraft and subsequent examination of
the pictures would provide the required intelligence. Combat losses were heavy
and, at times, out-paced the supply of newly trained pilots. The Air Force saw great
potential in using UAVs for certain types of missions such as surveillance and
reconnaissance. Although the program met with some positive results, the war
ended before the UAV development was complete and the program was
subsequently discontinued.
During the Vietnam conflict, however, enemy air defenses in some areas
of North Vietnam were so lethal that the Air Force once again tried UAVs and were
successful in maintaining a reconnaissance capability without a high rate of pilot
loss. But. the use of UAVs was looked at as a good solution for a temporary problem
and was not considered as a permanent fixture of the Air Force.
The Navy and the Marine Corps were aware of the success that the Air
Force had had with the UAV and began to see potential uses of their own. The
Navy envisioned an "over the horizon" capability for its ships whereby the Captain
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could see beyond his direct line of sight without relying on aircraft carrier support.
The UAVs could also be used in spotting for and adjusting fires for the 16 inch guns
of the battleships as well as for Marine artillery. Additionally, the UAV could be
used in locating vulnerable points in a beach assault or assisting in other ways with
amphibious operations.
In 1985. the Navy and Marine Corps began a UAV program which
would eventually field what became known as the Pioneer system.
2. The U.S. Army
The Army had been aware of the experiments with UAVs that the Air
Force had conducted but did not see any great potential with the program until the
Israelis successfully used remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) in the 1970s. An American
engineer and model airplane buff working in Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur
War designed and constructed a large model airplane, attached a television camera,
and in just six months created the mini-RPV. The RPV. unlike the UAV. could be
controlled by a ground operator. He sold these RPVs to the Israeli Air Force for
540.000 each. In 1982, the Israelis used the RPVs to locate more than 18 Syrian
surface-to-air missile batteries in the Bekaa Valley. Jet fighters were then dispatched
and destroyed every position in less than one hour. [Ref 9|
The Army's basic concept for the UAV was to provide the ground
commander with the ability to "see over the next hill." The commanders on the
ground have traditionally complained that air assets have been slow to respond to
their needs and that intelligence gathered by the aircraft is usually hours, or even
days, old by the time it is relayed to the front lines. The Army wanted a capability for
surveillance and reconnaissance that was solely dedicated to the ground
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commander. An RPV similar to that used by the Israelis seemed to fit the
requirement.
B. THE ARMY'S AQUILA PROGRAM
The Army established a UAV/RPV program to provide its commanders with an
ability to "see over the next hill" and called it the Aquila. The operational
requirements set forth by the Army included the following: 1) the RPV would be
forward deployed, controlled by a ground operator, and after its flight, fully
recoverable; 2) since ground units move frequently, a maximum air time of three
hours was thought to be sufficient: 3) the size and weight limitations would be
such that four soldiers could carry the RPV; 4) because of the unpredictable terrain
in the forward areas, the recovery system should be a net rather than a landing strip;
and 5) its mission would be to detect, locate, and identify targets, adjust artillery fire,
and designate targets for laser guided munitions.
1. The Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle
The Aquila RPV was a small propeller-driven, automatically and
remotely controlled aircraft. It was intended primarily for target acquisition and
field artillery support, and was designed to be survivable over hostile territory.
The system could perform reconnaissance, detect, identify and locate targets,
adjust artillery fire, laser-designate targets for destruction by laser-guided
munitions, and perform battle damage assessment. The air vehicle was launched
from a truck and was recoverable and re-useable. The vehicle carried a small
television and eventually a Forward- Looking Infrared (FUR) sensor. The Aquila
had the following characteristics:
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Weight: 265 lbs at launch
Endurance: 3 hours
Speed: 48-98 knots
2. Chronology of Events
The Mission Need Statement (MNS) for what would become known as
the Army Aquila program was published in 1974. During the Concept
Exploration Phase, the Army contracted with Lockheed and the first experimental
flight was flown in December 1975.
In 1979, the contract for full-scale development was awarded to
Lockheed, the only bidder resulting from a competitive solicitation. The following
announcement appeared in the November-December 1979 issue of the U.S.
Armv's Field Artillery Journal;
On 31 August 1979. the U.S. Army awarded a S101 million contract
to Lockheed Missiles and Space Company for full scale engineering
development of a Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) system to be used for
aerial target acquisition, designation, and reconnaissance missions. l
The Army envisioned a 43 month engineering development program and
would procure 780 aircraft at an approximate unit cost of $100,000. The Army
contracted with the Harris Corporation from Melbourne. Florida, for the Modular
Integrated Communication and Navigation System (MICNS) which was the main
data link between the aircraft and ground control units. The MICNS was
Government-Furnished Equipment (GFE) which would be integrated into the RPV
svstems of all of the Services. Because of difficulties encountered bv the other
1 U.S. Army Field Artillery Journal. "FA Test and Development." Fort Sill. OK. Nov-Dec 1979. p. 39.
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Services with the MICNS. it was eventually dropped from the plans of all of the
programs except the Aquila.
Numerous technical problems ranging from controlling the aircraft while
in night to the aircraft's net retrieval system arose, as well as difficulties with the
MICNS. These problems along with funding cuts in 1981. contributed to cost
increases and schedule delays.
In 1982. the Army added a night mission capability to its operational
requirements which further increased costs. In addition, the Army revised its
employment concept to base the RPVs in rear areas of the battlefield. This change
allowed the Army to reduce the total number of aircraft it would need to procure
since the aircraft would now support a larger area of operations within the Corps
rather than the smaller and more numerous divisions and brigades. However, the
Army did not modify the specifications for size and weight, method of recovery, or
maximum flight time.
In mid- 1983. at the urging of the Army. Lockheed moved its Aquila
Operations from Sunnyvale. California to Austin. Texas. Austin was closer to the
primary test site at Fort Hood. Texas, and should have facilitated better coordination
between the Army and Lockheed. The move further delayed the program.
In 1984. in light of the technical problems and continually increasing
costs, the Army conducted a study of alternative RPV systems. Excluding several
key factors which may have led to an alternative choice, the study found that the
Army should continue with the Aquila program.
By 1985 total procurement costs had increased to S2 billion, even with a
50% reduction in the number of aircraft to be procured. Instead of procuring 780
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aircraft the Army would seek to procure only 376. The development schedule
increased from 43 months to 91 months.
In August 1985. the program management was transferred from the Army
Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM) in St. Louis to the more experienced Army
Missile Command (MICOM) in Huntsville. Alabama. At that time, the seventh
project manager in eight years was assigned and only two of 37 civilian personnel
were transferred to the new program office at MICOM.
After poor results on initial contractor and Army tests, and several
postponements, the Aquila completed its last operational test in March 1987. It had
major problems in five of its ten performance categories.
In December 1987, although quick fixes had been applied to the problem
areas, the decision was made to discontinue the Aquila program. |Ref 10|
3. Major Issues with the Aquila Program
It seems evident that the Aquila RPV was not a model acquisition
program. Unit costs rose from the initial estimate of $100,000 to SI.8 million per
aircraft. Delays stretched the program development schedule to twice the initial
estimate. More than $50 million of Lockheed's own money was spent trying to
salvage the program and several military careers were ended prematurely.
The program's failure can be attributed to a number of issues depending
on one's point of view. According to a marketing director for Lockheed assigned to
the Aquila project who retired shortly after the termination of the program, the
Aquila fell victim to a strong Israeli/U.S. Navy lobby for an alternative to the Aquila.
the Pioneer. He also attributed at least a one year delay to moving the operations
office to Austin. Texas and the Army's Program Management to Huntsville. Alabama.
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Additionally, he stated that the numerous technological problems were a result of
underestimating the integration difficulties of the various new technologies that
were being developed for the Aquila.
Conversely, the ABC News show 20/20 . painted an entirely different
picture. According to their investigative expose' which aired on February 13. 1986.
the Aquila failure was just "another gold-plated fiasco" in the tradition of S600 toilet
seats and $400 hammers. The television show attributed the four-fold cost increase
and the schedule delavs to Government mismanagement and contractor greed that it
implied was rampant in all military procurements at the time. [Ref 9]
The actual reasons for the failure of the Aquila program probably lies
somewhere between these two views. Some of the major issues which led to the
program's termination were: 1) over-specification of the system requirements and the
changing of operational requirements; 2) inappropriate Government/contractor
relationship and bias; and 3) program mismanagement.
The first issue of over-specification and changing of the operational
requirements may have initially been the result of the Army's desire to keep the RPV
unique from the UAV efforts the Navy was involved with at the time. The size of
the RPV was restricted to be a four-man portable airframe with a 13 foot wingspan.
It was to be employed in forward areas away from landing strips, which would
require a net recovery system. The requirement called for a minimum of three hours
of flight time. It had to include a laser designator in its payload, and would integrate
the MICNS data link system. Initially, the only requirement for the television system
was that it should be useable in daylight hours and periods of good visibility. Later,
this specification was changed because of a new 24 hour operational requirement
placed on the program which necessitated an infrared system. The infrared system
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made the Aquila more "saleable" to its critics, but. unfortunately, this added to the
program's delay as the new technology was incorporated into the RPV system and
also raised the unit cost by $900,000. The size constraints also presented problems
throughout the program. Controlling the aircraft was very difficult once all of the
required payloads were added. A three hour flight time gave more than adequate
on-station time when the RPV was to be forward deployed. But. as the operational
requirements changed to a rearward deployed concept and the flight time to the
area of operations increased; on-station time was reduced by one third to only 1 1/2
to 2 hours. The net recovery concept was also a requirement because the system
was to be forward deployed, however, when the operational requirements changed,
the specifications did not. The only advantage gained in changing to a rearward
deployed system was in the reduced number of aircraft required to support the
larger but less numerous corps. Had the specifications been changed, a number of
alternative RPVs would have been better suited to perform the required missions.
Several of the alternatives (which were larger in size) could carry the required
payloads. were easier to control by the ground operators, and could be recovered
either by net or by landing strip. [Ref. 1 1
1
The requirement for integrating a laser-designator was a key requirement
that differed from UAV programs undertaken by other Services. The laser-designator
would allow the RPV to designate targets for the Army artillery's Copperhead shell
which was a laser guided, armor penetrating round. The weight and integration
problems of the laser-designator contributed to the program's delays. Because of the
laser capabilities employed by the Apache and Scout helicopters, this requirement
could conceivably have been eliminated or postponed for the Aquila since the
ability to kill enemy armored vehicles was not a critical requirement. The MICNS
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system, which was GFE. contributed to the delays as well. The first MICNS was not
integrated with an RPV until mid- 1 984
Whether or not the changes in operational requirements were an attempt
by the Army to keep the program competitive, they indicate that the initial
specifications were not necessarily inflexible requirements. Certainly some of the
over-specifications and the changing requirements contributed to the cost overruns
and delays. The deletion of some of the specifications would have resulted in a
system which would have closely approximated that which the Navy was
developing at the time.
The next issue is that of Government/contractor relationship and bias.
Several GAO investigations indicate that, although the contract may have initially
been competitive, the Army clearly preferred Lockheed as its contractor In 1984.
when the Army conducted a study of alternative RPVs. it excluded three key
factors: Life Cycle Costs: a revised RPV employment concept: and future mission
payloads. According to a GAO report to Congress in January 1986. had these three
factors not been excluded, an alternative would most likely have been selected for
continuation of the program |Ref 10|.
The relief of key program office personnel during the difficult periods in
the program may have indicated to their replacements that their success would be
measured by the success of the program. Each major set-back with the Aquila
seemed to result in the appointment of a new program manager. The program office,
fearful for its own security, began to make every effort to help Lockheed in its
performance of the contract. In some cases, the degree of help from the military was
excessive. The GAO reported in October 1987. after the last OT&E, that the results
were misrepresented on several issues in favor of the contractor based on a
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Lockheed engineer's very questionable explanations or quick fixes. The contractor's
presence and participation in the OT&E were in violation of the applicable
regulations and instructions for the conduct of the test. |Ref 1 1 ] Even the reduction
in the number of aircraft to be procured was perceived as an attempt by the Army to
control costs in order to bring less attention to the problems with the program and
to give the impression that the contractor was successfully completing its mission.
The final issue which led to the termination of the Aquila program was
one of mismanagement on the part of the Army as well as the contractor. The
reasons for poor management on the part of the Army are debatable but the fact that
there were seven PMs in eight years is an indication that effective management was
lacking, if not impossible to achieve. The transfer of the program to MICOM was
based more on the superior program management reputation that MICOM had
within the Army acquisition community than on system compatibility. Even though
the program management was more effective at MICOM. the transfer itself
contributed to further delays.
The contractor also lacked good, strong management with the Aquila.
During the Concept Exploration Phase of the program, the aircraft carried $50,000
cameras on the early flight tests. There were numerous crashes during these early
flights and each time the camera was a total loss. Although the engineers working
on the program advised against flying the aircraft with the cameras on board, the
management thought that flights with the actual equipment would be of greater
benefit than trying to reduce expenses. This lax attitude towards conserving funds
prevailed as the contractor continually advanced to more difficult stages of the
program without resolving all of the technical problems encountered in previous
stages.
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4. The End of the Aquila
In December 1987. in light of budget realities, questions of affordability.
and guidance to kill rather than stretch out programs, the decision was made to
terminate the Aquila program. Although the Aquila had successfully demonstrated
fixes in the Force Development. Test, and Experimental (FDTE) tests and was
considered producible, it was not affordable. The Army position then supported the
development and fielding of a cost effective mix of UAVs. As a result of this
position, the Army became actively engaged with the other Services to determine a
strategy and management concept to achieve joint requirements and maximize
commonality in UAV programs. [Ref 12]
C. THE PIONEER PROGRAM
During the same period that the Army was developing the Aquila. the Navy
and Marine Corps were also in search of a UAV. The Pioneer was designed to be
employed on land, from battleships or from amphibious ships. The Pioneer has the
following characteristics:
Weight: 430 lbs at launch
Endurance: 5 hours
Speed: 60-95 knots
The Pioneer is significantly heavier than the Aquila with a weight of 430
pounds versus 265 pounds and also has a longer wingspan at 16 feet 10 inches
versus 13 feet. However, it has a longer endurance and faster speed. The primary
mission that the Navy and Marine Corps envisioned for a UAV was to provide
continuous aerial reconnaissance around an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) while
enroute to an objective and while operating in the objective area. Other possible
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uses for a UAV included providing Marine Corps ground commanders an organic
ability to "see what's on the other side of the hill." especially during amphibious
operations. They could also be used to provide a means of locating targets and
adjusting fires for the 16 inch guns of the battleships. |Ref. 15:pp. 40-42|
In 1985, the Navy initiated the Pioneer program and contracted with AAI
Corporation, which was teamed with Mazlat. an Israeli company. The Pioneer is a
small propeller-driven, automatically and remotely controlled aircraft, similar to the
Aquila. The Pioneer uses a runway takeoff or a pneumatic catapult and is recovered
with a net or on a landing strip. The Pioneer is an improved version of Israel's
combat tested Scout RPV but experienced some major difficulties in its early
developmental stages. The first Pioneer system was delivered to the Navy in May
1986. During the first six months of operation, several vehicles crashed; two due to
engine failure after launch, two were lost at sea for unknown reasons, and two
crashed during recovery. After several improvements were made to the system it
satisfactorily demonstrated its capabilities aboard the USS Iowa and with Marine
Corps companies.
D. UAVs IN DESERT STORM
During Operation Desert Storm, the Pioneer UAVs flew 533 sorties for a total
of 1,688 hours. At least one Pioneer was airborne at all times during the war. The
missions the Pioneer performed included targeting, artillery and naval gunfire
adjustment, reconnaissance and real-time battle damage assessment. The Pioneer
was also involved in the first ever "surrender" of enemy soldiers to an unmanned
aircraft. A Pioneer from the USS Wisconsin was intentionally flown low over the
Faylaka Island to let the Iraqis know that they were being targeted. Since the
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prev ious sightings of the small aircraft were followed by devastating attacks bv the
16 inch guns of the battleships, hundreds of Iraqi soldiers began waving white flags
at the RPV and were eventually captured.
The Marines used the Pioneer to direct air strikes and to provide near-real-time
reconnaissance for SEAL teams and Force Reconnaissance prior to and during
special operations.
The Army also used the Pioneers in Kuwait and Iraq during Operation Desert
Storm. During the ground offensive, battlefield commanders had success in using
the Pioneer to locate enemy positions, strengths, movements, and tactical disposition
with near-real-time support. Brigadier General Creighton Abrams. the Commander of
the 7th Corps Artillery, stated that "thanks to the PIONEER, the Army was able to
take out every piece of artillery that could reach the breach, and as a result not a
single round of artillery fell on Army units coming through." 2
The DOD fielding objective for the Pioneer has been completed. A total of
nine Pioneer svstems have been fielded with five in the Navv, three in the Marine
Corps and one in the Army.
In addition to the Pioneer, the Pointer and Exdrone UAV svstems were also
deployed in Southwest Asia. While all of the systems performed well overall, there
were some difficulties with each of the systems in one or more of the following
areas: Communications, Launch/Recovery operations, position location reporting,
target resolution, transportability, mission flexibility and maneuverability. The UAVs
in Desert Storm validated the need and capabilities of unmanned aircraft but
-Garrison. Major L.C.. "Pioneer in the Gulf War. 3rd Release." DON Report on The U.S. Nu\ > in Desert
Shield/Desert Storm. Office of CNO, Washington, D.C., 15 May 1992.
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because of the short comings of each system, a new program would be needed to
meet the future needs of the Services.
There were no Aquila RPVs employed during Desert Storm. Despite the
expenditure of nearly SI billion on the Aquila prior to its cancellation, the Army had
no working models or prototypes in its inventory for use during the conflict.
E. FORMULATION OF THE JOINT UAV PROGRAM
In 1986, the House Appropriations Committee was briefed that there were no
fewer than 12 separate RPV/UAV programs within the DOD at the time |Ref 13]. The
programs included the Aquila and Pioneer as well as the Pointer, the Skydancer. the
Amber, the AROD, the CL-227. the Exdrone. the Mercury Green, the Sprite and the
UARS. Congress was concerned with the failures of the Aquila and other UAV
programs and pointed to several problem areas including: 1) an apparent duplication
of effort; 2) extremely high program costs: 3) limited applications; and. 4) an
unfocused DOD strategy. As a result. Congress was compelled to act.
In December 1987. development and procurement funding for UAVs was
consolidated at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as mandated by the Fiscal
Year 1988 Appropriations Act. Public Law 100-202. The Act required that all
Service efforts be re-evaluated and a master plan be developed to ensure a
coordinated acquisition strategy for Service UAV needs. Both the Senate and the
House refused to provide additional funds for the Aquila or any other individual
Service UAV program until a joint program was established. The Senate language
specifically addressed the Remotely Piloted Vehicles programs within all of the
Services bv statins:
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Separate program elements for these efforts within each military service
have been eliminated, and the funds have been transferred to the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, which should establish funding and program
priorities, mandate requirements for single programs to meet the needs of
more than one service, and eliminate duplicative programs. To encourage the
elimination of such duplication, the Committee recommends that the Joint
RPV Program receive S52.6J0.000 in fiscal 1988. a reduction o( S52.6 10.000
from the budget request. 3
Prior to this time, the Services had been proceeding independently with the
acquisition of different systems even though the basic purpose and functional
requirements of the UAVs were very similar. As Congress had noted, there was no
unity of management, commonality of hardware, or a clear, well-defined mission
specified for the integration of the equipment within DOD. The Serv ices recognized
the same deficiencies as Congress had. but were reluctant to act towards a unified
effort until the Congress directed that it be done. DOD was therefore directed to
unify the management of all non-lethal UAV system acquisitions and the funding for
each individual UAV program would not be released until the master plan for a joint
acquisition program had been submitted to and approved by Congress.
The success of the UAVs in Southwest Asia indicated that there did indeed
exist a valid need for the capabilities provided by UAVs. There was enthusiastic
support at the highest levels of each Service for continued development of a UAV
system. The successful employment of a single system by more than one Service also
indicated that a joint program was not only a viable option but probably should
have existed all along. Had there been a joint program from the beginning, the Army
would most likely have had more than one system in use during Desert Storm.
The realties of a decreasing budget also demanded that the development and
procurement of UAVs in the future be more cost efficient. Since R&D in UAVs had
3 Congressional Mark and Language Summar\ tor FY89. 3 August 1988.
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already existed for many years and there were several contractors at an advanced
stage o\' development, the Congress felt that while a reorganization of the
acquisition process was needed, the program should not need to start over at step
one. The goals of the Congress were to establish a joint service UAV management
and technical structure, to reach agreement on system requirements, to acquire
UAVs on a joint basis, and to quickly procure a short range system using existing
off-the-shelf technology. Congress had no desire to unnecessarily delay the
delivery of operational systems to the users but insisted that the program be
managed more efficiently.
F. SUMMARY
Although the operational requirements for the Aquila and Pioneer systems
were very similar, there is no indication that a joint Service program between the
Army and the Navy was ever seriously considered by either Service. Instead, much
time, effort, and money was spent by each Service to develop separate systems.
Many of the same issues which plagued the Joint TFX Program also contributed to
the reluctance of each Service to enter into a joint venture for UAVs. However, the
level of duplication found in the 12 different programs combined with the adverse
publicity surrounding the very costly overruns, compelled the Congress to
intervene. If any of the UAV programs were to proceed, it would only be through
the efforts of a joint program.
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IV. THE JOINT UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES PROGRAM
A. INTRODUCTION
The joint unmanned aerial vehicles program strives to provide an
inexpensive and effective means of gathering information for both the battlefield
and naval commander without risking the capture or loss of friendly forces. In
today's era of declining defense budgets, the UAV is perceived to be a cost
effective alternative for supplementing the more expensive manned aircraft
systems. The primary mission of the UAVs is to provide reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA). Additional missions include:
surveillance for combat search and rescue; adjustment of indirect fire weapons:
rear area security support: battle damage assessment: and, radio and data relay.
UAVs can also provide capabilities in electronic warfare (EW), electronic support
measures (ESM), command and control and special operations. Allocating these
types of missions to UAVs increases the survivability of manned aircraft and
allows pilots to concentrate on the more demanding missions that require the
flexibility of manned systems |Ref 17|.
As previously stated, the UAV JPO is the result of Congressional direction to
consolidate all of the nonlethal UAV programs within the DOD. DOD responded
by forming a UAV Joint Project Office and designating the Navy as the Executive
or Lead Service. A UAV Executive Committee (EXCOM) was established and
charged with oversight responsibility. The members of the EXCOM were the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Director of Defense Research and
Engineering (DDR&E), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command. Control.
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Communications, and Intelligence (ASD(C^I|. and the Service Acquisition
Executives (SAE) of the Army. Navy, and Air Force. When the JPO submitted a
UAV Master Plan to Congress, funding authority was reinstated. The program can
be classified as a Joint Program Category S-6. i.e. a Fully Integrated Joint Program
Office as defined in Table I. Chapter II.
The UAV JPO's mission is "to expeditiously field quality UAV systems which
provide a significant tactical advantage to operational commanders." In addition
the JPO provides advice and guidance to other Federal agencies interested in
employing UAVs, and is guided by the following principles as outlined in the JPO
Master Plan: |Ref. 15:pp.l-2]
a. Continuously improve the process to develop, procure, and
support UAVs.
b. Develop an affordable family of UAV systems that are
interoperable.
c. Proactively foster the use of non-developmental items (NDI) and
commonality in order to achieve lowest operational cost.
d. Continuously address and support the expectations of all UAV
customers; consider the users as partners with the UAV JPO.
B. PROGRAM ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
1. Establishment of the UAV JPO
In response to the Congressional direction, the USD(A) created a
unique joint Service organization for UAV management. The EXCOM was
charged with overall responsibility at the OSD level and the joint program office















Figure 2 UAV Program Office Structure
In 1991. the EXCOM was disestablished and the UAV JPO was
brought under standard Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) milestone procedures
and management. Most of the members of the EXCOM were also members of the
DAB and felt that the program was progressing well enough that it could follow
the more conventional acquisition process. The streamlined procedures allowed
the program to bypass many DAB requirements but also required more input and
oversight by the EXCOM. The UAV was classified as a major acquisition program
and was designated Acquisition Category (ACAT) ID whereby the milestone
decision authority is the USD(A). The current management organization for the
UAV is as depicted in Figure 3.
The DAB is chaired by the USD(A) and the vice chairman is the Vice
Chairman of the JCS. The other members include the Army SAE. the Navy SAE.
and the Air Force SAE; the DDR&E; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Program Analysis and Evaluation (ASDfPA&E]); the Comptroller of the






























































































































2:p. 2-4|. The DAB. along with the Conventional Systems Committee (CSC), is
responsible for oversight, providing program direction and approving milestones
for the UAV JPO.
2. Management of the UAV JPO
The Navy, as the Executive Service, is responsible for designing,
developing, procuring and transitioning UAV systems to the Services. The UAV
Special Study Group (SSG) consolidates and reconciles requirements before
presenting them to the JROC for approval. The Working Group includes
representatives of the DAB/CSC. plus the National Security Agency (NSA),
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), UAV JPO and other
designated elements of OSD and Service staffs. The Working Group conducts
analyses and provide recommendations to the DAB and CSC. The UAV JPO
confers with the Working Group and the SSG to resolve requirements related
issues.
The UAV JPO receives program guidance through the chain of
command depicted in Figure 3. The Program Executive Officer (PEO) for the UAV
JPO is also the PEO for the Joint Cruise Missiles Project. He currently is
responsible for 12 different programs and has a Deputy PEO (a civilian) who also
serves as the Director of UAVs. (Ref 18]
3. The Family of UAVs
The first UAV DAB review was held on 10 December 1991 and the
approved final plan established a "family" of UAV systems. Upon review of the
various operational requirements, it became clear that more than one UAV would
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be required to meet all of the Services' needs. The family of UAVs includes a long
range Endurance system; a fast Mid-Range system; a simpler Short Range system;
and an inexpensive Close Range System for immediate unit level support. Table II
provides a summary of the Mission Need Statements for the four categories of
UAVs. The Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) resulting from the DAB,
dated 3 January 1992. also changed the classification of the Close Range (CR).
Short Range (SR), and Medium Range (MR) UAVs from individual ACAT II to
ACAT I programs [Ref. 19]. Each of the systems is managed by a separate
program office which reports to the UAV JPO. The CR and SR programs are
managed by the Army and are located in Huntsville, Alabama. The MR program is
managed by the Navy and is located in Washington, D.C. Additionally, there is a
Very Low Cost (VLC) UAV program managed by the Marines which is located in
Quantico, Virginia.
The Close Range (CR) system is primarily designed for use by Army
divisions and brigades/battalions and USMC battalions/companies for a capability
within their local area of interest (approximately 30 kilometers (km|). These
systems must be easy to launch, operate and recover and require minimum
manpower, training and logistics. They must also be relatively inexpensive.
The Short Range (SR) systems support Army divisions and corps and
USMC Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF). These systems can operate out to a
range of 150 km beyond the forward line of own troops (FLOT) and are more
sophisticated, can carry a wider variety of payloads, and can perform different
kinds of missions than CR systems.
The Medium Range (MR) systems provide pre- and post-strike
reconnaissance of heavily defended targets and augment manned reconnaissance
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TABLE II. JOINT PROGRAM MISSION NEEDS
CLOSE SHORT MEDIUM ENDURANCE
OPERATIONAL
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SERVICE NEED
REQUREMENT
USA. USN.USMC USA. USN.USMC 1 SN.USAF.USMC I SA. I'SN. I SMC
LEGEND
("2
- Command and Control
MET - Meteorology
TS - Target Spotting
SIGINT - Signals Intelligence
EW - Electronic Warfare JSIPS - Joint Sen ice Imager. Processing System
TA - Target Acquisition MASINT - Measurement and Signaures Intelligence
TD - Target Designator NBC - Nuclear. Biological and Chemical Recon
RS - Reconnaissance and Surveillance
(Source: Master Plan:p. 8)
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aircraft by providing high quality, near-real-time imagery. These vehicles are
designed to fly at high subsonic speeds but have limited on-station time over the
target areas.
Endurance UAVs are characterized by times of flight measured in days
and very great ranges and altitudes of flight. They can perform a wide variety of
missions and can carry many different types of payloads. The Mission Need
Statements of the four categories have been validated by the Chairman of the
JROC. The required capabilities of the UAV categories is graphically depicted in
Figure 4.
In addition to the family of UAVs. the JPO also assumed responsibility
for all other non-lethal UAV systems that had previously been in some form of
development. The UAV JPO is responsible for the management of logistics,
training, and test support for the Pioneer systems which are currently fielded and
are expected to remain operational until replaced by the SR system in FY98.
Several other UAV programs which are currently in various stages of
development but are not specifically funded are grouped into a concept
demonstration category and include the Maritime Vertical Takeoff and Landing
UAV, the Pointer, the Exdrone, and the Tilt Wing/Rotor (VTOL).
4. Acquisition Strategy
The UAV acquisition strategy is based on rapidly fielding common and
interoperable systems to meet operational requirements. The strategy includes: 1)
operational requirements agreed to by the Services and Unified and Specified
Commands; 2) procuring off-the-shelf technologies and commercially available






































ensuring interoperability with the command, control, communications and
intelligence (C^I) systems ot all Services and Commands.
An estimate ot" the desired procurement for each UAV system according
to the current Master Plan is provided in Table III.
TABLE III. PLANNED PROCUREMENT




1260 384 140 550
1878 768 208 542
176 48
*A system may include air vehicle! s), more than one kind of payload, mission planning and
control station (MPCS) equipment, launch and recovery equipment and ground support equipment.
**Not presently resourced.
(Source: UAV Master Plan:p. 10)
5. Interoperability and Commonality (I&C)
The UAV JPO recognizes the importance of interoperability and
commonality in the acquisition of effective UAV systems. This is a key benefit
derived from the joint status of the program. Since the UAV systems have many
common functions and can share as much common equipment and associated
software as possible, cost benefits should result. The systems must also be capable
of operating with the various Service and Unified and Specified Command C^I
operations as well as with other UAVs in order to be effective on the battlefield.
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The UAV JPO has established a common LIAV design architecture
based on the SR program which is developing an interoperable data link
subsystem for the entire UAV family to ensure communications capability
between the systems. An objective of the JPO is to minimize the number of new
data links required in order to integrate the UAVs into the Services' force
structures. All UAV ground stations should be able to receive and use data from
and be able to control the different types of air vehicles, regardless of the system
mix.
The basic strategy of the UAV JPO is to consider the use of existing
UAV system components and software modules when developing options for
new UAV capabilities. Developing subsystems in modules will allow for easy
interchanging of components from one system to another and will also facilitate
technology upgrades.
Because of the most urgent Services' needs, the SR system was selected
as the basis for interoperability, and accelerated acquisition was directed. The SR
system thus became the centerpiece of the UAV acquisition strategy. Since the
SR program is at a more advanced stage than any of the other UAV systems and
the SR Project Office is managed by a Service other than the lead Service, it
provides the best opportunity for an analysis of a joint service program. The other
programs within the UAV will not be specifically analyzed but will be referred to
when their actions either impact on or are impacted by the SR program.
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C THE SHORT RANGE UAV SYSTEM
1. Background of the UAV-SR
At the same time that development and procurement for UAVs was
consolidated at the OSD level in December 1987. funding for the Army's Aquila
RPV program was terminated. When the Joint Service UAV Master Plan was
submitted to Congress in June. 1988. the framework which had managed the
latter stages of the Aquila program became the nucleus of the new UAV-SR
Project Office. The UAV-SR system was given to the Army to manage since the
Army and the Marine Corps were envisioned as the primary users. The SR UAV is
to provide near-real-time RSTA to Army echelons above corps, divisions and
USMC expeditionary brigades out to 150 km beyond the FLOT. The following
Mission Need Statement for the SR System was approved by General Herres. the
Chairman of the JROC, on 16 December 1988:
A day and night imagery collection and near-real-time reporting
capability that can survey enemy elements and transmit to ground-based
or airborne battle management systems is essential to field commanders. A
cued, penetrating unmanned aerial vehicle system will meet the need
without the vulnerability and risk factor associated with the use of manned
aircraft. Specifically, the UAV-SR will provide a capability to obtain
information important to battlefield management, including target
identification. 4
An Army Colonel was assigned as the PM immediately after the
Program Office was established. The EXCOM approved an acceleration of the
program since the program management organization was not entirely new and
4 Memorandum For Commander Naval Air Systems Command, "Program Endorsement Memorandum on
NAVAIR Acquisition Plan AIR 89-2 For The Joint Short Range Unmanned Aenal Vehicle System (UAV-
SR)." 28 February 1989.
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because the Services had apparently reached a consensus on the program
requirements.
The UAV Charter directed that the SR system serve as the
developmental baseline for the family o( UAVs and that the acquisition strategy
should ensure interoperability and maximize commonality. The program focuses
on the fielding of a prototype which would serve as the baseline and upon which
block upgrades could be made to meet all operational requirements. The modular
approach in designing the architecture allows for upgrades and provides a
flexible baseline for the other systems as well.
2. Budget and Funding
The FY89 Appropriation Act included S41M(million) RDT&E and
S51M Procurement funds for all UAV programs for that year. Of the funds.
S35.7M Procurement and S12.5M RDT&E were for the Short Range UAV.
Budgeting for the UAV JPO is sponsored by DOD in a unique arrangement. The
OSD Program Element (PE) 0305141D contains the RDT&E and Procurement
funds for UAVs. These funds are used to support the RDT&E for the systems,
subsystems, components and interoperability/commonality efforts in addition to
the Procurement of all UAV systems. DOD is responsible for the program funding
but the actual execution of the funding is the responsibility of the UAV JPO. The
UAV JPO does have limited flexibilitv to shift funds within the JPO. In most joint
programs, funding is either budgeted through the lead Service for the entire
program or through each participating Service which pays its proportional share.
Since the operational requirements for the UAV-SR were similar to
those of the Aquila and Pioneer programs and a strong developmental base
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already existed to meet the SR requirements, the program could compete for non-
developmental items (NDI) and therefore require less RDT&E funding than the
other systems. The total estimated budget for the UAV-SR program according to
the Acquisition Plan No. AIR 89-2. dated 12 December 1988 for the years
through FY 93 is shown below in Table IV.
TABLE IV. UAV-SR PLANNED FUNDING FY89-FY93
FY89 FY 90 FY91 FY 92 FY 93
Procurement 35.7 18.8 17.0 120.0 110.0
RDT&E 12.5 15.0 15.0 15.0 20.0
TOTAL 48.2 33.8 32.0 135.0 130.0
Systems 4 — — 6 9
(In millions of dollars)
(Source: Acquisition Plan No. AIR K9-2:p. 3)
The budget realties, especially in the acquisition climate of today,
almost certainly guarantees that the budget a program plans for will not remain
constant throughout the life of the program. Most PMs reluctantly accept the fact
that their budget will most likely be reduced. However, in the case of the UAV,
the program actually experienced a growth in its budget. The actual funded
amounts for FY92 and FY93 increased from the amounts planned for in the
Acquisition Plan. For FY 92 the RDT&E funds increased from $15M to S15.2M
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and the Procurement funds rose from S120M to S132.7M. In FY 93 the RDT&E
funds went from a planned S20M to S31.4M and Procurement funds increased
from S130M to S144M. |Ref. 20:p. 3]
3. UAV-SR Program Management Organization
The UAV-SR Project Office is located at Redstone Arsenal in
Huntsville. Alabama. The program is a tenant organization within the Missile
Command (MICOM). The program competes with the other Army acquisition
programs at Redstone (most of which are assigned to PEO Tactical Missiles) for
matrix personnel and other service support from MICOM. The UAV JPO is
located in Washington. D.C. The current staffing of the project office is as
outlined below.
TABLE V. UAV-SR PROJECT OFFICE MANNING
Civilian Military
Authorized Assigned Authorized Assigned
Core 33 33 5 5
Matrix 48 45 3 3
Total 81 78 8 8
(Source: UAV Program Office Briefing Slides. 9 Apr 92)
:>/
The entire UAV-SR Project Office is currently manned by Army active
duty and civilian personnel. The Marine Corps had one representative assigned
to the project office until he was transferred to the recently established UAV-CR
project office w hich is also located at MICOM.
4. UAV-SR Program Progress
A full and open competition began the acquisition of the UAV-SR in
FY89. A draft request for proposal (RFP) was provided to industry in December
1988 and was followed by the final RFP in March 1989. The proposals were
based on a fixed-price-incentive contract for the production of two integrated SR
systems for testing and price options for three production lots in FY92, FY93, and
FY 94. Based on the responses from industry, contracts were awarded on 15
September 1989, to McDonnell Douglas Missile Systems Company of St. Louis.
Missouri and Israeli Aircraft Industries Ltd. of Tel Aviv, Israel. The two
contractors were allotted 18 months to prepare delivery of complete SR systems
before a Technical Evaluation Test (TET) and Limited User Test (LUT) would be
conducted to select the eventual contract winner. The competitive
demonstrations were scheduled to begin in March 1991. |Ref 20] The SR
baseline schedule is shown in Figure 5.
Both contractors experienced delays in equipment deliveries and in
achieving readiness for the tests. The program schedule was delayed for six
months. The technical testing began in July 1991 and was completed in April
1992. The LUT was completed in July 1992. The outcome of the TET and LUT
resulted in the selection of Israeli Aircraft as the winning contractor. The
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management. The SR Project Office is currently awaiting a DAB decision for Low
Rate Production (LRP) approval. After the DAB. LUT II will be conducted to
examine the operational suitability of the system when operated and maintained
by typical military users. An Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) will
then be conducted and used to support the full rate production (FRP) decision.
The SR system consists of a mission planning and control station
(MPCS), which includes one mission planning station (MPS) and two ground
control stations (GCS); remote video terminals (RVT); eight air vehicles; modular
mission payloads: ground and air data terminals: launch and recovery equipment:
and integrated logistics support (ILS).
The MPCS collects, processes, analyzes, and stores data and distributes
battlefield information by interlacing with present and planned C^I systems.
Flight and mission commands are sent through ground data terminals to the air
vehicle and modular mission payloads from the MPCS. RSTA information and air
vehicle position data are sent by downlink either through airborne relays or
directly to the MPCS and external receiving systems. Data are received by the
MPCS and can be distributed to RVTs located in tactical operations centers. The
mission capability will be enhanced as advanced mission payloads become
available. A diagram of the UAV SR employment concept is depicted in Figure 6.
The objective of the SR program is to field a total of 48 systems with 27
going to the Army, 18 for the Marine Corps, and 3 for training purposes. The
performance specifications for the system include:
Radius of Action Greater than 150 km
















Sensor Type Day/Night imagery plus relay
The contractor successfully met the following Exit Criteria during the
TET and the LUT:
Launch and recovery from unimproved areas (200m x 75m)
Right endurance of 8 hours
Sensor payloads resolution in accordance with specification
Successful relay of mission data at specified ranges
Contractor's production readiness was verified
5. Cost Effectiveness Comparisons
Several Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analyses (COEA) were
conducted by the Project Office to validate the program approach and to support
milestone decision reviews. Because of the variety of alternatives to the UAV-SR,
two separate approaches for COEA analyses were conducted. In most cases, the
UAVs were compared to manned aircraft which would usually be required to
perform identical missions. In one case, an alternative approach of comparing the
mission performance of other systems (such as the ATACMS) with and without
UAVs was used. In each case, the UAV-SR was determined to be the most cost
effective solution. The UAV-SR was clearly the most cost effective solution when
compared to manned aircraft such as the F/A-18, F- 16, and Army helicopters. It
was also the most cost effective solution when compared to the additional
ATACMS rounds that would need to be fired if the UAV capabilities were not
available to provide targeting information.
A Phase II COEA also determined that the UAV-SR not only provides a
uniquely needed capability on the battlefield, but also provides a unique function
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within the family of UAVs. The other UAVs. manned aircraft and national
intelligence assets do not provide the required imaging capabilities that the SR
system provides. |Ref. 20: p. 10|
The COEA analyses also concluded that the Service unique systems in
use when the UAV JPO was established did not have the essential technical
growth potential, range, and other key capabilities for mission accomplishment,
and therefore, were rejected as alternatives to the UAV-SR.
D. SUMMARY
The JPO has developed a successful acquisition strategy for the family of
UAVs. The aspect of interoperability and commonality appears to be providing
the expected benefits as envisioned in the Master Plan. However, the sense of
urgency surrounding the initiation of the joint program resulted in several unique
management arrangements, e.g. the establishment of the EXCOM and the funding
process. These arrangements combined with the joint status of the program have
led to a number of issues which have either presented the SR program with
problem areas or have the potential to become problems in the future.
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V. SHORT RANGE LAV ISSUES
A. INTRODUCTION
The following issues were identified through a series of interviews with key
Government individuals within the UAV-SR Program Office, the UAV JPO, and
with representatives of the users within the Army and Marine Corps. Comments
received during the interviews were used in conjunction with the program
documentation to formulate issues which impact the UAV-SR program and are a
direct result of the joint status of the program. The issues identified are not
necessarily problem areas for the UAV-SR but, because of the organization,
structure of the program or with a change in key personnel, have the potential to
become problem areas.
B. ISSUES WITHIN THE UAV-SR PROGRAM
1. Operational Requirements
In a discussion with a group of acquisition students at the Naval
Postgraduate School. Rear Admiral Bill Vincent. Commandant of the Defense
Systems Management College, stated that "the greatest problem with Joint
Service Acquisition Programs is the correct definition of mission requirements."
Anyone ever associated with a joint service program would probably agree w ith
Admiral Vincent. The presumption that each Service has a separate and unique
role in the defense of the nation has created a tendency by the Services to
preserve their individual identities by any means. This tendency has often
resulted in a reluctance to participate in joint Service ventures and, when
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participation is unavoidable, an unwillingness to compromise on Service specific
requirements.
The UAV-SR program has experienced some difficulty in solidifying its
operational requirements but not solely because of the traditional reasons. The
guidance from Congress to consolidate the management of all UAV programs and
to proceed in an excelerated manner presented the program management with a
unique opportunity. The initial organization under the EXCOM allowed the
program management to streamline the normal acquisition process.
Representatives of each Service were gathered together in a room and instructed
to quickly develop a MNS which each Service could agree to. After a day and a
half, the Services reached agreement on the MNS for the family of UAVs. In
accordance with guidance received from the USD(A), the statements were short
and concise (two pages). Recognizing that one of the contributing factors to the
failure of the Aquila was the over specification of system requirements, the Army
was satisfied with a short, simple statement of mission need. The Marine Corps
also agreed to the basic mission requirements which were then validated by the
JROC.
At the time, the new DOD 5000 series publications had not yet been
released and the UAV-SR was classified as an ACAT II program. These
circumstances combined with the flexibility the program had under the EXCOM
allowed the management to delete certain non-essential requirements. As a result,
an Operational Requirements Document (ORD) was not initially required for the
UAV-SR nor was one prepared. The program proceeded along with the basic
requirements as specified in the MNS until a Marine Corps Letter defining the
Marine SR requirements was received on 17 May 1991. The Marines were
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present at the initial meeting when the requirements were generated but had
expected to formulate a more formal and detailed requirements document later.
When it became apparent to the Marines that the program was proceeding based
on the broadly written MNS. the letter was drafted to quantify specific
operational requirements which the Marines desired but were lacking. Since the
SR system was already well into its development, the Marine requirements at this
late stage were viewed as a sudden change by the Army.
In February 1991. the revised DOD 5000 series publications were
implemented and prescribed new procedures and documentation requirements for
acquisition programs. In January 1992, after the disestablishment of the EXCOM.
the ADM resulting from the DAB review reclassified the UAV-SR as an ACAT I
program. These two events now made the ORD a required document for the SR
program. An ORD was written by the SR program office with input from the
other Services and was finally signed in November 1992, four years after the
program was initiated. The usefulness of the ORD is questionable since it was
developed after the contractor and system had already been selected. Unlike most
acquisition programs which use an ORD to guide and direct the program through
the design and development stages, the UAV-SR used the actual system
capabilities to construct the ORD.
As of the present date, each Service has been willing to accept the
operational requirements of the system and no major changes to the requirements
have been incorporated into the ORD. However, the process of developing and
reaching agreement on the ORD was very time consuming and could have
potentially adversely impacted the program. The DAB review may have been
further delayed or design changes to the system may have been required had the
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ORD not been satisfactory to each Service. The inflexibility of the DAB process
would not allow the requirement tor an ORD to be deleted lor the SR even
though it would have marginal utility. Although some problems arose in the
requirements generation process for the UAV-SR. compared to the problems
McNamara experienced with the Joint TFX program in the 1960s, they were
minor. In fact, the requirements generation process for the UAV can actually be
considered a strength of the program by the JPO.
The success the UAV-SR did enjoy in the requirements generation can
be attributed to two factors: 1) a willingness on the part of each Service to
compromise, and 2) the active role played by the JROC and the Special Study
Group (SSG).
Each Service stated that the final system is not exactly what it would
have procured had the program been single Service, but the compromises by all
were minor. The Marines preferred a smaller system which would allow three
aircraft to be transported on one 5-ton truck. They also desired a system which
could clear a 15 meter obstacle in the landing zone and have a system reliability
of 85%. The Army had no such requirements but compromised by agreeing to an
aircraft capable of clearing a 10 meter obstacle. The other Marine requirements
were dropped. The Army also compromised on the acquisition process by
agreeing to change the wording or sentence structure in the ORD to satisfy
procedural differences between the Services. Although the basic SR system is
virtually the same as it was initially conceived, the formality of reaching a
consensus on the requirements may have added an additional 90 days to the
schedule according to an estimate within the project office.
The role of the SSG was important in resolving requirements related
issues and providing the JROC with timely recommendations. The SSG is chaired
by an Army Brigadier General and includes representatives from the other
Services of equal rank. The SSG was effective in minimizing the effects of triv ial
differences in requirements and also in ensuring that any delays would not
adversely affect the program. The JROC was also actively involved in the
requirements process.
2. Budgeting and Funding
No major problems were identified in the budgeting arena but the
potential exists for problems because of the unique structure within the UAV JPO.
First of all, funding at the DOD level versus funding at the Service level presents a
number of advantages and disadvantages. Funds are allocated in two DOD
Program Elements (PE); one for RDT&E and one for Procurement. The PEO has
the authority to shift funds of the same PE from one program to another within
the UAV. From the perspective of the UAV-SR this ability may be perceived as a
disadvantage since the SR program currently has the largest budget and any shift
of funds will most likely take money away from the SR to fund other UAV
programs.
The PEO may also perceive the funding arrangement as a disadvantage
compared to a non-joint PEO or even the normal joint PEO. In a normal non-joint
PEO, such as the PEO Tactical Missiles located at MICOM. the PEO has eight
major programs and has the authority to reprogram up to S4.0M RDT&E and
S10.0M Procurement funds from one program to another. With a larger number of
programs, there is a greater likelihood that more than one program is in the same
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stage of development and therefore there is more flexibility in reprogramming
funds. In the UAV JPO. the SR program is the primary program using Procurement
dollars and if a problem were to arise and procurement were delayed, funds may
expire before thev could be used. The funding profile for the UAV-SR compared
to the total UAV JPO is depicted below.
TABLE VI. FUNDING PROFILE
FY 92 FY92 FY 93 FY 93
UAV JPO UAV-SR UAV JPO UAV-SR
RDT&E S 66.9M S 15.2M S129.1M S 31.4M
PROCUREMENT S138.4M S132.7M S148.9M S144.0M
(Source: Master Plan: p. 63)
If the PEO were to shift funds from one program to another, the high
visibility and joint status of the UAV would almost assuredly result in strong
opposition from the affected Services, DOD and even Congress. As a result, the
apparent flexibility the PEO would have is probably non-existent.
Another disadvantage of the funding arrangement may arise if the
program encounters difficulties and requires a large amount of additional funds.
While gaining additional funds for any program in a period of declining budgets
is difficult, it is virtually impossible if a program does not have an advocate who
will fight for scarce resources. In the case of the UAV, DOD must be the requestor
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of any additional funds and therefore would play the role of an "advocate" for
the program. However, DOD guidance has been to reduce the appearance of
advocacy for a program and it is unlikely that DOD would reverse itself in the
case of the UAV. The Services are not likely to fight as hard for funds for a joint
program funded by DOD either, especially when there are funding problems
within their own Service programs. The most likely alternative should a funding
shortfall occur for the UAV-SR. would be to stretch the program out.
A final disadvantage with budgeting for the UAV JPO concerns the use
of Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds. O&M funds are allocated to the
Services but must be used to pay for certain aspects of the UAV program which
are not covered bv RDT&E and Procurement funds. The Services have not
shown the same commitment to using O&M funds for a joint program as they
have for a single Service program. The UAV-SR program found that although
each Service agreed that a Joint Training Facility for all UAVs was needed, the
Services were reluctant to use their own O&M funds to help support it. The funds
were eventually provided by the Army.
Most of the disadvantages concerning the budgeting for the UAV
discussed in this section have not yet materialized. They are mentioned as
concerns and possible problem areas but the reality within the UAV JPO is that
the funding has been remarkably stable. In fact, funding has actually increased
slightly during a period when many programs are experiencing cutbacks. This
fact points out a possible advantage of the budget structure in that the funds are
not accessible to the Services for reprogramming out of the UAVs and the
perception that the biggest advocate for joint programs may, in fact, be Congress.
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3. Test & Evaluation
The T&E aspects of the UAV-SR program has presented another issue
area because of the joint status of the program. The testing for the UAV-SR
includes DT&E and OT&E and involves personnel and test facilities of all of the
Services.
The first concern of any program T&E usually centers around the Test
& Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) which is required for all ACAT 1 programs in
accordance with DOD Instruction 5000.2. The DOD Instruction states that in a
Multi-Service T&E the lead Serv ice will prepare a single TEMP and a single T&E
report on the operational effectiveness and suitability of the system for each
participating Service. [Ref. 8:p. 8-7] In the case of the UAV-SR. the Army, as the
lead Service, prepared the TEMP (classified SECRET). The TEMP was required to
be approved by all participating Services in addition to DOD. While it is important
that each participant is satisfied that the T&E will provide an adequate
assessment of the program's progress, the potential exists to create an overly
burdensome process as well. Each Service, along with DOD. has individual veto
power over the TEMP wherein any one of the organizations may reject the entire
document if it does not meet with that organization's approval. This stipulation
increases the workload for the program office because it must prepare a TEMP
which satisfies the separate, and sometimes unique, requirements of each Serv ice
as well as DOD. The project office must be familiar with and adhere to a separate
set of rules and regulations for each agency and then incorporate all of the
different requirements into a single document.
Additional problems and delays arise because each Service must
approve test results prior to their acceptance. One such delay was experienced
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with the Limited User Test (LUT) 1 which was the first evaluation of the
equipment as it was operated by actual users. LUT 1 was completed in July 1992.
however, as of November 1992 the final test report had still not yet been
approved and signed off by all of the Services . Such delays can have an adverse
impact on other areas of the program which may be dependent on the approval of
the test results. Any unresolved issues pertaining to the LUT 1. for example,
could be very damaging to the program as the project office prepares for its
upcoming DAB approval for LRP. The longer it takes to receive the test results
and comments back from each Service, the less time the project office will have to
resolve any issues.
Another area of concern for Joint programs is maintaining a perception
that all participants are equally involved in the T&E process. The Navy is the lead
agency for the DT&E as well as the OT&E. The Army has the Joint Training
Facility as well as test facilities co-located with the project office. The Marines
must provide user representatives for the test and the Air Force wants to be
involved. To ensure that each Service has a "piece of the action" in the testing of
the SR system, responsibilities have been divided among several different test
sites. Some of the test locations which have already been used include the:
-U.S. Army Electronic Proving Ground. Ft. Huachuca. AZ
-Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division. Trenton, NJ
-Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Pt. Mugu, CA
-Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, CA
-U.S. Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, AL
Additionally, the LUT II which is the follow-up user test is scheduled to
take place at Eglin Air Force Base, Valparaiso, FL.
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While using all of the test sites may provide the best combination of the
required restricted airspace, ground space and sea space to conduct UAV testing,
additional costs are incurred, more coordination is required, and the testing will
take much more time. The cost for the LUT I was approximately S15M and the
projected costs for LUT II and the IOT&E are S12M and S25M respectively. It
was estimated by the project office that if the SR were a single Service program
the total T&E costs could be about 50% less. Additionally, using different test
sites from different Services created the need for the program office to alter the
test or otherwise make provisions to ensure that the rules and regulations for each
range were satisfied. The rules and range regulations varied greatly from site to
site and required additional coordination between the project office and the
various test facilities.
Philosophical differences between the Services also becomes a factor in
the T&E of joint programs. In the UAV-SR. the Marines approach to the testing
was one in which they wanted to correct all problems or deficiencies that were
identified, no matter how small the problem may be. The rationale from the
Marines is that they would rather fix a problem in the developmental stages of the
acquisition cycle rather than rely on limited O&M funds to fix a problem once the
system has been fielded. The Army is more willing to accept a system with minor
deficiencies rather than delay its fielding. It has a larger O&M budget and can
more easily fix minor problems even after a system has been fielded. This concern
was a larger issue for the UAV-SR because of the short and somewhat broad
MNS which served as the requirements document for the first four years of the
program. Although the MNS provided certain advantages by not overspecifying
requirements, a disadvantage of a broad statement is that it created ambiguity in
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determining what standards the system should be tested to. The ambiguity of the
MNS resulted in different interpretations by each Service and the test community
of what the test parameters and standards should be.
Finally, since the testing was a multi-service T&E. members of more
than one Service were required to conduct the testing. Although a potential for
problems exists whenever an event relies on the coordination between two or
more Services, the UAV-SR experienced minimal problems in this area. The LUT I
required both soldiers and marines to operate the equipment and no major
problems were identified. For the upcoming LUT II. the testing will be conducted
with integrated platoons made up of soldiers and marines. The concept of
integrated platoons was a compromise that will actually benefit both Services.
The Marine Corps agreed to provide a group of marines for the testing according
to normal procedures whereby marines are selected at random for assignment to
the testing facility. All of the marines were inexperienced with UAVs and, if tested
as a separate platoon, would require a lengthy training period. The Army wants to
use experienced soldiers who could form a cadre for future UAV units and also
serve as instructors on the equipment after the tests are completed. The integrated
platoons meets the needs of both Services and also provides a more realistic
evaluation of the users by integrating experienced and inexperienced personnel.
4. Project Office Organization
The area of Project Office organization includes not only the staffing of
the UAV-SR project office but also its geographical location. The obvious
question concerning the staffing of the UAV-SR project concerns the apparent
lack of representation by the participating Services. The project office is staffed
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totally by Army active duty and civilian personnel. The Marines were represented
b> a single officer for the first three years of the program but the billet has since
been transferred to the newly established UAV-CR program. Since the Marines
will eventually receive one third of the total SR systems fielded, their interests
could be better served by better representation in the project office. The Navy,
although not anticipated to receive any SR systems, has a tremendous stake in
the UAV-SR program nonetheless since the SR serves as the baseline system for
the entire family of UAVs. The lack of any representation by the other
participating Services in the SR project office gives the impression that the
program is not a high priority for the other Services. Additionally, the opportunity
to apply the lessons learned from the SR program to the other UAV programs is
not taken advantage of by the other Services.
The present staffing arrangement probably does give the PM greater
control over his personnel since they are all from the same Service, however, it
also has a downside. The entire staff at the SR office is experienced at working in
Army programs and therefore is accustomed to preparing documentation and
reports and following acquisition procedures in accordance with Army guidance.
However, the lead Service is the Navy and as such the Navy is the approving
authority for all program documentation. The Navy requires that its procedures be
followed in the program management, not the Army's.
Another problem for the SR program is the geographical separation
from the JPO. With the program office in Alabama and the JPO in Washington
D.C.. coordination between the two offices is made more difficult. The PM spends
a majority of his time traveling between the two locations and thus has less time
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to spend at the project office. Of course, the separation could also be a benefit in
that it leads to less oversight by the JPO.
Another potential problem could result because of the geographical
separation in the area of support activities. The UAV-SR must compete with all of
the other programs at Redstone for matrix personnel support as well as other
service support from MICOM. If resources within MICOM become scarce,
programs at Redstone co-located with their PEO might have an advantage over
the SR program whose PEO is located in Washington. There has been no problem
with the support provided by MICOM to date.
5. Logistics
Historically, logistics has been one of the most difficult issues to resolve
in joint programs. The logistics program within the UAV-SR began with the
development of a joint logistics document, the JILSP. Each Service was actively
involved in its development.
The UAV-SR experienced some problems in the area of logistics
because of its joint status but many of the problems were a result of the
acquisition of NDI systems. When a group of 60 auditors from the various
Services began reviewing, analyzing and approving all aspects of the logistics
program, a series of findings resulted. Problems were identified with the Human
Systems Integration Plan and the Integrated Logistics Support Plan. Most of the
problems were procedural in that an element of one of the plans did not conform
to the customary procedures of a Service. Although time consuming, most of
these differences were resolved without much trouble. However, DOD was less
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cooperative. DOD auditors rejected the Human Systems Integration Plan and
insisted that it be re-written to meet all DOD standards.
Most of the auditor's findings concerned the level of analysis provided
by the contractor for the various components of the system. The findings
addressed certain deliverable documents and analyses that are normally required
of the contractor but. because many of the SR components were NDI. were not
available. In most developmental programs, the level of analysis and
documentation required is specified early in the program. As the contractor
progresses through the developmental stages, the analysis is performed and the
documentation prepared. Since the Government pays for this process, it is usually
not challenged bv the contractor. With an NDI svstem. though, the contractor has
no guarantee of covering his expenses and is. therefore, less likely to conduct the
costly analysis. In the case of the UAV-SR. the program maximized the use of NDI
systems and as a result much of what was required by the auditors was not
available. The contractors were required to recreate early developmental
processes, for example, to perform reliability and quality assurance tests to satisfy
the audit findings.
The program now has a single audit agency, the Logistics Review
Group, which is chaired by the Navy. The Logistics Review Group has been
successful in reducing the duplication of effort which existed when each Service
placed separate demands on the program. The single audit now satisfies the
requirements of all of the Services. The Group can also present a unified position
to resolve problems which arise from DOD.
In the area of UAV training and supplies, the Army Logistics Center
serves as the lead agency. Training for all Services will be integrated at one site. A
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single training facility is maintained at Ft. Huachuca. Arizona. The program also
plans to have a single set of publications for all Services with addendums which
could be added to address any Service unique requirements. Differences in
maintenance procedures between the Services will be addressed in addendums to
the maintenance manuals. Some additional cost was incurred by the program in
configuring the UAV interface test sets to meet differences in hardware of the
existing maintenance equipment within the Services.
6. Interservice Rivalries
The final issue for the UAV-SR program involves interservice rivalries
or parochial interests of the Services. Each individual interviewed mentioned this
as a problem and gave several examples of how it has impacted different aspects
of the program. The following are typical interservice parochialisms:
a) Mission Implications. Interservice rivalries became evident in
the early stages of the program and have contributed to differences in how the
Services even view the UAV program. The Army and Marines have expressed
enthusiastic support from the beginning for the concept of using an unmanned
aerial vehicle to supplement manned aircraft. The Navy and Air Force, however,
have been more resistant to the program and see the UAV as a threat to its future
manned programs. While the Army and Marines are eager to field the system, the
other Services appear less so.
b) Engineering and Development. As the UAV-SR program
began to progress, the Navy felt that its experience in aircraft development was
far superior to that of the Army and that the program would be successful only
with close supervision by the Navy experts. The Navy thus provided the program
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with all of the MIL-STDs it had on aircraft development and instructed the Army
to follow them. The MIL-STDs included a specification for leather seats in all
aircraft. This requirement was eventually waived.
c) Acquisition Philosophy. A large part of the interservice rivalries
centers on which Service has the best acquisition process. Each Service has
slightly different ways of interpreting the DOD 5000 series publications and.
therefore, has slightly different procedures and documentation requirements.
These differences have probably been the most time consuming problems for the
UAV-SR project office to work out. Most of the time the product was not
changed or altered in any way but the wording in a document may have been
changed to satisfy one Service or a procedure may have required a time
consuming explanation of why it was done a certain way.
At the 1992 Symposium for the Monterey Chapter of the NCMA. Mr.
Stephen Conver, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development &
Acquisition) characterized the acquisition process as "overly cautious and one
which includes a study of every possible contingency which often overly
burdens the program and leads to more delay and higher costs." Mr. Conver was
not speaking of joint programs but of single Service programs in general. If his
characterization is correct, what happens in a joint program is that every possible
contingency is multiplied by the number of participants and the burden becomes
that much greater. Mr. Conver has attempted to change this practice within the
Army by placing the focus on the product instead of the process. He advocates a
streamlined process to minimize the required paperwork to only that which is
essential so that the product can be delivered as quickly as possible. Although
Mr. Conver is not directlv involved in the management of the UAV-SR program.
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his philosophy is implemented as much as possible by the Army program
personnel. Conflict arises, however, if the Marine Corps follows a different
philosophy that is entrenched in detail and documentation. The tendency by
each Service involved with the UAV-SR has been to not compromise when its
process or requirements were questioned and the end result has been that the
project office workload increased three-fold. The attempts by one Service to
streamline the acquisition process can not work in a joint program if the program
is required to satisfy the requirements and processes of each Service involved.
Each Service as well as DOD also felt that it not only had a right but a
responsibility to provide oversight to the program. Again, more time was required
to respond to the increased oversight. An example of how the program was
affected can be illustrated in the briefing presented to the JROC. In most
programs the PM is not even required to brief the JROC, but because of the
visibility of the UAV, he was required to do so in this case. Although the final
briefing to the JROC did use time not normally required, it was far shorter than
the seven pre-briefings the PM conducted to all of the interservice agencies prior
to the JROC.
d) Resource Allocations. A final, and potentially explosive issue,
caused by interservice rivalries may result when the different programs within the
JPO compete for scarce resources. The UAV-SR program has been acknowledged
as the primary program to meet the UAV needs of the Army and Marines. The
Navy SR requirements were satisfied by the currently fielded Pioneer system and
the developmental Maritime program. However, problems have surfaced in
fulfilling the Navy SR requirements. With the retirement of the battleships within
the Navy, there is no longer a ship with a large enough area to employ a UAV
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with a net retrieval system. The Navy planned to fill the void by fielding a vertical
take-off and landing UAV. the VTOL. The VTOL. though, has not vet been
funded. In a Joint UAV COEA update presented on 24 April 1992. using a Cost
Analysis conducted by the Center for Naval Analysis, the VTOL was shown to
have a cost effective edge over the present UAV-SR fixed wing aircraft |Ref 21 1.
The interpretation of these results vary depending on one's perspective. The
Army may view it as an attempt to re-configure the UAV-SR program to meet the
primary needs of the Navy. Not to imply that the Center for Naval Analysis could
be biased towards the Navy in conducting its COEA. the analysis was. however,
based on several questionable assumptions. The biggest assumption was that
speed is the critical factor. From the Navy's viewpoint, the VTOL may indeed be
the best SR system for all Services, even though the program is not even at the
advanced developmental stage. Regardless of which Service is correct, if the
VTOL continues to lack funding, competition for development funds will
certainly create a major challenge for the program office.
C. BENEFITS OF THE UAV-SR JOINT STATUS
Most of those interviewed were very quick to point out a number of
problem areas and disadvantages regarding the joint status of the UAV-SR.
Identifying benefits of the joint status was not quite as easy. It was generally
agreed by all that the program has gained certain benefits from its joint status but
that it was difficult to quantify the exact level of the benefits. The benefits listed
below are the areas in which the joint status of the UAV-SR has given the
program an advantage over single Service programs.
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1. Funding Stability
The greatest benefit enjoyed by the UAV-SR program because of its
joint status has been the stable level of funding it has experienced. During a
period which has seen funds for many acquisition programs reduced, the UAV-SR
has actually seen its budget increase slightly. This is undoubtedly the result of the
favorable light in which the Congress and DOD view joint programs. Although
DOD has refused to serve as a vocal advocate for the program. Congress seems to
have filled the role nicely. RDT&E and Procurement funds were increased for
both FY92 and FY93.
2. Interoperability & Commonality
Another benefit of the UAV joint status is the interoperability and
commonality that the program offers. The level of commonality in the family of
UAVs will allow a UAV launched from an Army system to be flown forward, to
relay data to an Air Force unit and then to be handed off to the control of a
Marine ground control station. This capability is invaluable as the military relies
more and more on joint operations. The UAVs are also linked to other national
intelligence systems such as the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, or
JSTARS. In mountainous regions where the radar's view is obstructed, the UAVs
can maneuver at low altitude and relay imagery back to JSTARS. |Ref. 22
1
The strategy of using modules in the development of the UAV-SR also
allows for easier integration of technology upgrades and the transfer of
components from one system to another. Slight modifications to meet Service
unique requirements are also possible by simply removing one module and
replacing it with another.
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3. Cost Savings
Overall cost savings is another benefit which results from the program's
joint status. While it is difficult to determine exactly how much money is saved,
the duplication of effort and expense that existed when there were 12 separate
UAV programs within DOD has been minimized. No data are currently available
on exactly what the cost savings will be. but lower unit costs will certainly result
from the increased quantities in systems procured. Additionally, the use of a base
system for the family of UAVs has reduced the costs associated with the various
common components. The Marines, as a small Service, also benefitted from the
larger budget allocated for the T&E stages of the program. The T&E budget for
the UAV-SR would have been difficult to match had the program been a Marine
single Service program. The T&E area also received the benefit of the experience
gained by the Navy during the Pioneer program which also indirectly contributed
to lower costs.
D. SUMMARY
The UAV-SR program has been impacted by issues involving the operational
requirements, budgeting and funding, test and evaluation, project office
organization, logistics, and interservice rivalries. The program has faced these
issues in addition to the myriad of other issues w hich face all PMs involved with
acquisition programs. While single-Service programs are certainly a great
challenge, joint programs present the Program Manager with more time
consuming issues which often have little or no effect on the product itself.
Patience and diplomatic skill are often essential characteristics of the joint
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program manager. Although these issues may be specific to the UAV-SR. many
may also apply to joint programs in general.
In the view of many (especially Congress), the benefits of joint Service
acquisition programs far outweigh the problems such programs might present.
The apparent cost savings and benefits derived from interoperability and
commonality will probably continue to lead to funding stability for joint
programs. It seems very likely that joint programs will be utilized more in the
future. To gain the maximum benefit from joint programs. DOD should use lessons
learned from programs such as the UAV and revise the current joint acquisition
process.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
Joint Service acquisition programs can be an effective alternative to
traditional single-Service programs as DOD struggles to continue a viable
modernization strategy in the current acquisition climate. The current acquisition
system, however, is very cumbersome and filled with numerous unresolved issues
which discourage the greater use of joint programs. Further examination of
existing joint programs, such as the UAV. could provide invaluable lessons
learned to DOD by identifying possible modifications to the present joint
acquisition process and thereby making joint programs a more viable alternative
for the future.
Like most joint programs, the UAV has been faced with a number of issues
because of its joint status. It has successfully resolved many of the issues and
simply survived the others. The general attitude of those associated with the
program is that, overall, the UAV-SR is a good acquisition program. The program
office and the JPO are staffed with good, quality personnel. The leadership
throughout the organization was unanimously identified as strong. In fact, many
of the issues were not presently problem areas because of the strong leadership.
The problem issues appeared to be more of a nuisance than a major threat to the
program. If the UAV-SR stays on its current schedule, it will have taken
approximately five years to place effective systems in the field. Such a short
fielding period would be a significant feat for any program.
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The UAV Joint Program demonstrates that despite the many issues which
still exist, there are valid benefits to be gained in joint ventures. However,
changes should be made to the joint acquisition process to fully maximize the use
of joint programs. In analyzing the UAV program, it was found that there is too
much variance in the management of joint Service programs. Much o\' the
variance is a result of the ambiguous nature of the regulations for joint programs
and usually leads to the problems and issues joint programs inevitably encounter.
The following are the researcher's specific conclusions to the research
questions posed in Chapter I. Where applicable, reference is made to the chapters
where a more detailed discussion can be found.
What are the major issues involved in the management of Joint Service
programs?
The major issues involved in the management of joint Service programs are
listed below and discussed in greater detail in Chapter II, Section D:
1) Early establishment of a joint charter. Quick establishment of a
joint charter which clearly defines responsibilities and acts as a
binding document for all participants is necessary for interservice
coordination.
2) The need for strong leadership within the program. The leadership
must be capable of placing the interests of the program ahead of
parochial interests or personal desires.
3) Establishment of equitable management and engineering
procedures within the program office. If the program management
fairly represents the interests of all Services there is usually less
external interference and oversight in the program.
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4) Resolution of interservice conflicts and requirements. A
willingness to compromise is essential for resolution of interservice
conflicts and requirements. However, the need to compromise may
also leave each Service feeling as though it is not receiving the
exact system it actually desires.
5) Joint program oversight. Joint programs are usually of greater
interest to higher authorities than single Service programs and as a
result they tend to receive more oversight.
6) Joint program organization structure. Organization of the program
structure should reflect the level of interest of the various
Services. Some Services may feel inadequately represented in the
joint program organization.
7) Logistics support. The logistics area is one of the most difficult
issues to resolve in joint programs because logistics is organized
and implemented differently in each Service.
8) Access to critical program data. Providing complete data and
information to all interested parties is essential. Selective omission
of controversial data or information provided to a Service. DOD or
the Congress can severely damage the credibility of a program.
9) Lessons Learned. The joint Service acquisition process may be
flawed, although review and study of the lessons learned of past
joint programs can be a meaningful source for ideas and
improvement.
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In addition to these issues, the lessons learned from the UAV-SR are
discussed below as part o\' the applicable subsidiary research questions. One
underlying cause of each of the major issues is the presence of parochial interests
and/or a general distrust among the Services. These attitudes are deep rooted in
the various traditions of the Services and are not easily changed. In fact, without
outside intervention, the UAV would probably still be managed through a series
of single Service programs. Reducing the impact of parochial interests could be
accomplished through a mutual agreement of all individuals associated with joint
programs or (the more likely route) by changing the joint acquisition process to
eliminate opportunities for parochialism. A recommendation for changing the
process is discussed in the last subsidiary research question of this Section.
What is DOD's current policy for the Management of Joint Service
Programs?
DOD's current policy for the management of joint Service programs is found
in a three page section of DOD Instruction 5000.2. The Instruction provides
general policies and procedures for the management of joint Service programs. It
specifies the responsibilities for the lead Service and states that the joint program
will have single quality assurance, change control, and integrated test programs. It
is ambiguous, though, in how the joint program is to achieve these. The
experience of the UAV-SR has been that these program objectives are achieved
only by incorporating the different requirements of each Service into a massive.
all encompassing program. Additionally, a summary of the procedures as outlined
by the DSMC is contained in its Joint Logistics Commanders Guide for the
Management of Joint Service Programs and summarized in Chapter II of this
thesis. Although the Guide offers some very useful information on the
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management of joint Service programs, it is only a guide. The fact that current
DOD policy is vague allows each Service the opportunity to interpret
requirements consistent with that Service's policies. As a result, a great deal of
additional program time and effort is required to negotiate and resolve these
parochial interpretations with little or no contribution to the end product.
Is there enough similarity among the single Service UAV programs to
warrant a joint Service program?
The history of the UAV single Service programs is discussed in Chapter III of
this thesis. The two primary single Service UAV programs examined are the
Aquila and the Pioneer. Both aircraft were primarily designed to provide the
ground or ship commander with the capability to conduct near-real-time
reconnaissance and surveillance. Both were also capable of spotting for and
directing indirect fire weapons. The size and in-flight capabilities of the aircraft
were similar as was the launch and retrieval systems. There was no evidence of a
sharing of technology or of lessons learned between the two program offices. In
fact, there appeared to be an adversarial relationship between the programs.
During Desert Storm there were no Aquila RPVs employed but the Pioneer
provided the Army with the capabilities it desired of the Aquila. The similarities
between these two systems and the present SR operational requirement of the
Services does, indeed, warrant a joint Service UAV program.
What lessons can be learned from the UAV Joint Program?
The lessons that can be learned from the UAV Joint Program can best be
discussed by addressing the six major SR issues identified in Chapter V. The
issues identified are not all inclusive but those mentioned were addressed on more
89
than one occasion during the interviews. The issues are also not necessarily
actual problems but rather may be areas which require more attention because the
program is joint or because they have the potential to become problems. A
comment that was made by each individual interviewed was that the UAV-SR
program required more time in virtually all areas of program management because
of its joint status. The single recurring cause was that since there was no specific
procedure for joint programs, the process had to be duplicated to meet the
requirements of each individual agency. In addressing the issues for the UAV-SR
program, another recurring comment was that most of the issues were more of a
nuisance than an obstacle. It was generally agreed that the program was
progressing far better than one might expect. The program's strong leadership
from the JPO down to the project office appears to be the main reason that many
of the issues were not actually problems. The fact that the Army and Marines are
anxious to field a system quickly has also given each Service a greater willingness
to resolve minor differences.
Several of the strategies used bv the UAV-SR to minimize issues could be
applicable for other joint ventures as well. The modular approach used in the
system design, for example, seems to offer great utility in adjusting to minor
differences in Service unique requirements. The major issues identified in the SR
program are:
1) Operational Requirements. Problems were experienced in the SR
program in the generation of operational requirements but were eventually
resolved with little adverse affect. Initially, gathering representatives of each
Service and presenting them with a short deadline was effective in reaching a
consensus on the MNS. The broadly written MNS may be helpful in that it did
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not overspecify requirements, however, more detailed requirements could have
prevented problems which arose later e.g. difficulties in identifying T&E
parameters. The active involvement of the SSG and the JROC also contributed to
the early resolution of problems in this area. A similar time constraint could be
effective for the requirements generation of other joint programs but a slightly
more detailed document such as the ORD should be the final product. Once the
operational requirements are agreed to. any changes should be required to be
submitted through a formal review process which could minimize trivial desires of
any single Service.
2) Funding. Funding for joint programs should not be controlled at the
DOD level. In the UAV program, funding should be controlled by the lead
Service. This could give the UAV JPO the same flexibility with funds that other
PEOs have. However, if all funding is routed through the lead Service, problems
with interservice rivalries may arise.
3) Test & Evaluation. A single agency should be responsible for the T&E
of joint programs. Any T&E issues should be resolved early in the program and
the lead test agency should have sole responsibility and authority over the
program. For the UAV-SR, the Navy is the lead T&E agency and should be the
only Service with final approval authority for the TEMP and other test
documentation.
4) Project Office Organization. The project office organization of a joint
program should reflect the level of involvement of each Service. The UAV-SR
should have more Marine representation and should have an appropriate level of
representation from the Navy JPO. A joint program made up solely of individuals
from one Service does not adequately represent the interests of all participants.
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5) Logistics. There should be a single logistics system for joint
programs. The UAV-SR could serve as a model for other programs in this area.
The oversight provided by the Logistics Review Group, the single training
facility, and the single set of publications are all examples of how the SR program
has resolved a normally difficult issue.
6) Interservice Rivalries. Resolving the barriers which parochial
interests place on joint programs can best be achieved by changing the
acquisition process. A specific policy which removes all ambiguity must be
implemented by an authority above the level of the Services. Such a policy
should clearly delineate responsibilities and leave no room for interference from
outside agencies.*=•'
What are the actual benefits of the joint status as experienced within the UAV
IPO?
The actual benefits that the UAV JPO experienced as a result of the joint
status of the program are in line with the generally stated benefits. The program
has reduced the duplication of effort that existed previously. The total RDT&E
costs for the joint program will be less than the RDT&E costs for the previous 12
separate programs within DOD. Although the exact savings are not known, the
procurement costs will be decreased with a larger quantity of systems as well. In
the case of a smaller Service such as the Marine Corps, a more thorough T&E is
possible since they do not have to bear the sole burden of the expense.
Additionally, the benefits of interoperability and commonality appears to be
a major success for the UAV JPO. The UAV is capable of interoperating with and
even enhancing other national intelligence systems such as the JSTARS. The
capability of a single UAV to provide data to all Services and to intemperate with
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other UAV family systems is also invaluable as joint operations become a key
aspect of U.S. defense strategy. The commonality in components also provides
cost savings by reducing duplication of effort and by allowing for a more efficient
logistics system.
Finally, and probably most importantly, the benefit of a joint program is that
it is in line with the wishes of the Congress and DOD. The experience of the
UAV-SR in maintaining its funding level clearly points to the favorable view the
Congress and DOD have regarding joint programs.
What recommended changes to the current acquisition policy would
encourage the establishment of more joint service programs and contribute
to a greater likelihood of their success?
A greater emphasis on joint programs is needed at the senior levels of the
Services and at DOD. In a recent speech. Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, assailed the DOD for not making a greater
effort in the joint arena [Ref. 23 J. It seems evident that the Congress will continue
to look more favorably on joint ventures than on single Service programs. If the
Services wait until they are prodded into joint programs then they will continue
to be met with limited success. The following are recommended changes to the
current acquisition policy:
1) Structured Process for Joint Programs. Once a program becomes joint,
the inefficiencies and duplication within the process need to be eliminated. This
can only be done by establishing a more structured process for joint programs
and removing the ability of individual Services to create barriers for the program.
Many of the problems encountered by joint programs are created because the
programs are considered no different than any other program. Each Service tries
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to force the joint program into a mold of how it manages its single Service
programs. The realty is that the joint program is different and therefore should be
managed differently. However, there will always be a reluctance on the part of
the Services to "give up" something unless the other Services reciprocate. This
creates a needless cycle of negotiation that adds little to the product but delays
the entire process. Mr. Conver's criticism of the tendency to place more emphasis
on the process rather than the product is very appropriate in the case of joint
acquisition programs.''
A structured, streamlined acquisition process directed from either the DOD or
the JCS could alleviate the ambiguity in the current procedures. Specific
guidance should be given as to which documentation and procedures will be
followed in joint programs. One option could specify the exclusive use of the
procedures of the lead Service. Another option could be to develop a separate
and unique procedure for joint programs. This option would allow the selection
and use of the best procedures currently implemented by the various Services. If
no such procedures are available for a particular aspect of the program, they
could be developed rather than simply relying on outdated procedures.
2) Organization. In the case of joint program organization, the options
should be limited to a select few rather than the multitude currently available. The
joint program office could be organized with a lead Service as with the UAV or
with an oversight group which could report to the JCS. The lead Service
organization could be appropriate in cases where one Service has an overriding
interest in a system. The lead Service method, however, will not resolve all
problems with Service parochialisms. A centralized management organization
3 1992 Symposium for the Monterey Chapter o\~ the NCMA. 6 November 1992.
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similar to the Special Study Group (SSG) within the UAV program may offer the
best solution in cases where several Services have equal interests in a program.
The SSG could be made up of representatives of each Service and report directly
to the J ROC. The JROC would be responsible for all joint programs. Ideally, a
series of SSGs could provide a similar function for joint programs as the current
PEO structure provides for the Services. The joint programs could be organized
according to similar missions or system types. For example, the UAVs would be
grouped with other national intelligence gathering systems. A group that
presently exists such as the Conventional Systems Committee could serve as the
SSG for a group of similar joint programs. The chairman of the JROC could serve
in a similar capacity as the Service Acquisition Executives for all joint programs.
3) Funding. Funding could be directed through the JROC to the SSG
down to the specific programs. This would allow for a certain amount of
flexibility in reprogramming funds and negate the appearance of parochialism that
may presently exist. The SSG or the JROC would also be in a better position than
DOD to serve as an "advocate" for a program or at least make a judgement
concerning program priorities. Funding should not be left to the discretion of the
Services once a commitment has been made to initiate a joint program. The
creation of special funding arrangements as with the UAV (through DOD) should
not be continued due to the inflexibility of reprogramming of funds.
4) Use Existing Acquisition Agencies. The centralized management
of joint Service programs should not require the establishment of new acquisition
agencies. The SSG should have the authority to bid for the services of agencies
which presently exist. As in the case of the UAV. the SSG could contract with the
Army Logistics Center for all logistics related concerns of a program. Or it may
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chose to appoint the Navy to provide all audit services as the UAV-SR program
did. The problems with joint programs do not appear to be a result of separating
responsibilities among different agencies but more a function of not doing so and
therefore allow ins each agencv of each Service to create a role for itself.
B. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
The answers to the research questions above include numerous
recommendations to improve the UAV-SR program as well as the current joint
acquisition process. The recommendations require change in two major areas of
the current structure. First, is to change to the current process. The joint
acquisition process should be simplified and the priority must shift from the
process to the product. The present process burdens the joint program with
duplication and unnecessary requirements. If the process remains cumbersome,
the Services will continue to be reluctant to initiate more joint ventures. Second,
is to create an organizational structure which minimizes the affects of
parochialism. Responsibility for joint programs should be clearly defined with a
single chain of command. Appropriate authority should be given to a centralized
management structure to reduce the impact of agencies external to the program.
The following is a summary of the previously discussed specific
recommendations which apply to the SR program as well as to joint programs in
general:
1) A structured process specifically for joint Service acquisition programs
should be created.
2) A centralized joint program management organization should be
formed.
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3) A standard means of funding joint programs should be implemented.
4) The joint program management should have the authority to bid for
and appoint lead agencies for program support.
5) The joint requirements document should be developed and agreed to
early in the program and changes should be limited to only those which
are viewed as critical by all participants.
6) A single T&E agency should be appointed and have sole responsibility
and final approval authority for test matters.
7) The joint program office organization should be representative of the
level of interest of all participating Services.
8) A single logistics system should be established in joint programs.
9) Changes should be made to the structure and process of joint Service
acquisition programs to minimize the affects of parochialism.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This thesis examined only one specific program within one JPO and
generalized conclusions and recommendations which could be applicable to joint
programs in general. Areas of further research include:
1) An examination of other joint programs which are organized differently
than the UAV should be conducted to determine if similar issues exist.
2) An organizational model should be designed and developed for the
express purpose of managing joint programs. This approach could involve a
comparative analysis of existing joint programs or programs with joint potential
and the grouping of these programs into a SSG/JROC type of organization. This
study could also identify the feasibility and procedural requirements which might






Army Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Short Range
Redstone Arsenal. Alabama
Interview Granted: 23 October 1992
UAV Team Member
U.S. Armv Intelligence Center and School
ATTN: ATSI-TSM-UAV
Fort Huachuca. Arizona
Interview Granted: 2 November 1992
UAV Team Member
USMC UAV Requirements Team
Marine Corps Systems Command
Quantico. Virginia
Interview Granted: 2 November 1992
Director UAV JPO & Deputy PEO (CU)
UAV Joint Program
Washington, D.C.
Interview Granted: 17 November 1992
Lead Program Analyst
Army Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Short Range
Redstone Arsenal. Alabama
Interview Granted: 18 November 1992
Lead Engineer (also served in Requirements Office)
Army Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Short Range
Redstone Arsenal. Alabama
Interview Granted: 18 November 1992
Chief. Systems Support Division
Army Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Short Range
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama
Interview Granted: 18 November 1992
99
Project Manager
Army Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Short Range
Redstone Arsenal. Alabama
Interview G ranted: 20 November 1992
100
REFERENCES
1. Program Manager's Guide, p. 3-8. Naval Postgraduate School class text.
September 1990.
2. DOD Directive 5000. 1. Defense Acquisition, p. 1-3. 23 February 1991.
3. Fox. J. Ronald and Field. James L.. The Defense Management Challenge.
pp. 1 1-20. Harvard Business School Press. Boston, MA.. 1988.
4. Rohertv, James M. Decisions of Robert S. McNamara. p 67. University of
Miami "Press. Coral Gables. FL.. 1970.
5. Kaufmann. William W., The McNamara Strategy, pp. 245-250. Harper &
Row. New York. NY.. 1964.
6. The Defense Systems Management College. Joint Logistics Commanders
Guide For The Management Of Joint Senice Programs, 3d ed.. Fort
Belvoir, VA., 1987.
7. GAO Report. Joint Military System Acquisition By The Military Services:
An Elusive Strategy, (Report NSIAD-84-22), p.l2.U.S. General
Accounting Office, 23 December 1983.
8. DOD Instruction 5000.2, Defense Acquisition Management Policies and
Procedures, 23 February 1991.
9. 20/20 ABC Television News Show. "Another Gold-Plated Fiasco," Journal
Graphics. 13 February 1986.
10. GAO Report, Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle: Recent Developments and
Alternatives, U.S. General Accounting Office. January 1986.
1 1. GAO Report. Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle: Its Potential Battlefield
Contribution Still in Doubt. U.S. General Accounting Office, October
1987.
12. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle/Remotely Piloted Vehicle Information Paper,
Office of Congressman Dave McCurdv, D, OK.. 1 1 February 1988.
13. Congressional Records, House Armed Services Papers, "Authorization and
Oversight Hearings on DOD Authorization and Appropriations for FY 87."
March 1986.
101
14. Congressional Records, "Appropriations Committee Hearings for DOD
Appropriations for FY 86." March 1985.
15. DOD Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Joint Project Office. Unclassified.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) Master Plan 1992. 15 April 1992.
16. "Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Support." Military Review, pp. 44-49. August
1989.
17. Office of the Chairman. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unclassified Final Draft. Joint
Pub 3-55. 1. Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAV), p. II- 1, 1 October 1991.
18. "Program Executive Officer-Cruise Missiles Project and Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles Joint Project." Army Research, Development &
Acquisition Bulletin, p. 28. September-October 1992.
19. Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) Unclassified Memorandum.
Subject: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Acquisition Decision Memorandum.
3 January 1992.
20. DOD Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Joint Project Office-Short Range,
Unclassified Draft. Integrated Program Summary (UAV-SR). 9 April 1992.
21. Kusek, Leonard J., Short-Range/Medium Range UAV COEA Cost
Analysis.Center for Naval Analyses. Alexandria. VA., October 1991.
22. Mclntire. Katherine. "What Everv Commander Will Want: A UAV." Army
Times, p. 14, 30 November 1992.
23. Gelb, Leslie H., "End Costly Interservice Rivalries," The Monterey County
Herald, p. 9A. 28 July 1992.
102
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
1. Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria. VA 22304-6145
2. Library. Code 052
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey. ^CA 93943-5002
3. Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange
U.S. Army Logistics Management Center
'£5
Fort Lee, VA 23801-6043
4. Professor David V. Lamm




5. Professor Thomas H. Hoivik










Army Unmanned Aerial Vehicles-Short Range
Redstone Arsenal, AL 35898-5791
8. Director UAVs
Cruise Missiles Project & Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Joint Project Office
Washington. D.C. 20361-1014
9. CPT Michael E. Hogan
802 NW 75th Street
Lavvton. OK 73505
103



DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOI
11
GAYLORD S
r^-etfa
W%

